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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, or Agency) 
often supports or justifies its decision making using the results of risk 
assessments, which are analyses that characterize the nature, 
likelihood, and magnitude of health risks to humans and ecological 
receptors (e.g., birds, fish, wildlife) from chemical pollutants and 
other stressors that may be present in the environment.1 
Conventionally, the Agency has evaluated the effects and risks 
associated with a single pollutant in a single exposure medium, such 
as lead in drinking water. In reality, people are exposed to mixtures of 
pollutants and to the same pollutant through a variety of media, 
including air, water, and food.2 Moreover, “[c]hemical, biologic, 
radiologic, physical, and psychologic stressors are all acknowledged 
 
1 Basic Information, What is Risk Assessment?, EPA, http://epa.gov/risk 
assessment/basicinformation.htm#risk (last updated July 31, 2012). At its most general, 
risk assessment involves “the evaluation of scientific information on the hazardous 
properties of environmental agents and on the extent of human exposure to those agents. 
The product of the evaluation is a statement regarding the probability [expressed 
quantitatively or qualitatively] that populations so exposed will be harmed, and to what 
degree.” AM. BAR ASS’N, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND 
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 354 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila 
R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008) (quoting NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON RISK 
ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK 
ASSESSMENT 25–26 (1994) [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND 
JUDGMENT]). 
2 EPA’s Stochastic Human Exposure and Dose Simulation (SHEDS) Model, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/heasd/research/sheds.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2013); EPA, OFFICE 
OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN HEALTH RESEARCH STRATEGY 2–6 (2003), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/nheerl/download_files/publications/HHRS_final_web. 
pdf. 
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as affecting human health.”3 Consequently, to arrive at a realistic 
assessment of exposure risks, regulatory authorities arguably should 
consider cumulative stressors and exposure data derived from 
cumulative risk assessment in decision making.4 
In particular, the EPA should further explore the value of applying 
a cumulative risk analysis to decision making in many contexts, 
including setting air quality and emissions control standards and 
making permitting decisions under the Clean Air Act (CAA).5 In a 
2009 report, the National Research Council (NRC) issued a series of 
recommendations to improve the EPA’s use of risk assessment, one 
of which focused on the need for cumulative risk assessments.6 The 
 
3 COMM. ON IMPROVING RISK ANALYSIS APPROACHES USED BY THE U.S. EPA NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT 213 
(2009) [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT] (citing 
Michael A. Callahan & Ken Sexton, If Cumulative Risk Assessment Is the Answer, What Is 
the Question?, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 799 (2007). According to the U.S. EPA’s 
Framework for Cumulative Risk Assessment, a stressor is any “physical, chemical, 
biological, or other entity that can cause an adverse response in a human or other organism 
or ecosystem.” RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT 74 (2003) [hereinafter EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.epa.gov/raf/publications/pdfs/frmwrk_cum_risk_ 
assmnt.pdf. 
Exposure to a chemical, biological, or physical agent (e.g., radon) can be a stressor, 
as can the lack of, or destruction of, some necessity, such as a habitat. The stressor 
may not cause harm directly, but it may make the target more vulnerable to harm 
by other stressors. A socioeconomic stressor, for example, might be the lack of 
needed health care, which could lead to adverse effects. 
Id. In another example, “chemicals such as toluene can damage the auditory system and 
have been shown to potentiate the effects of a physical stressor, noise, on hearing loss.” Id. 
at 47. Examples of non-chemical stressors include: lack of health care; personal activities 
(e.g., smoking, diet, and alcohol consumption); natural phenomena (e.g., forest fires, 
floods); biological pathogens; psychosocial stress; noise; and heat. Id. at 51–52. See 
generally Callahan & Sexton, supra; Ari S. Lewis et al., Non-chemical Stressors and 
Cumulative Risk Assessment: An Overview of Current Initiatives and Potential Air 
Pollutant Interactions, 8 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 2020 (2011). 
4 EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 2; 
Callahan & Sexton, supra note 3. According to the EPA’s Framework for Cumulative Risk 
Assessment, cumulative risk assessment involves an “analysis, characterization, and 
possible quantification of the combined risks to health or the environment from multiple 
agents or stressors.” EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 
3, at 72. Cumulative risk assessments may include both human health and ecological 
effects. Id. at 30. Cumulative risk refers to the combined threats from exposure to multiple 
stressors via all relevant routes. Callahan & Sexton, supra note 3, at 801. 
5 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2011). 
6 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
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NRC also recommended that the EPA expand its current risk 
assessment model to view risk assessment “as a method for evaluating 
the relative merits of various options for managing risk rather than an 
end in itself.”7 The NRC’s cumulative risk assessment 
recommendation stated that unless the EPA takes account of 
cumulative risks, risk assessment itself might become irrelevant in 
many decision contexts because a primary aim of risk assessment 
should be to inform decision makers about the public health 
implications of various strategies for reducing environmental 
exposure, and omission of cumulative risks may not provide the 
information needed to discriminate among competing options 
accurately.8 These statements may add impetus to the Agency’s shift 
toward cumulative risk analysis. 
Moreover, cumulative risk assessment can be particularly helpful 
in addressing environmental justice concerns,9 because numerous 
studies have shown that minority, low-income, and indigenous 
communities are impacted by multiple environmental hazards, such as 
industrial facilities, landfills, transportation-related air pollution, poor 
housing, leaking underground tanks, pesticides, and incompatible land 
uses.10 The chemical-specific focus of conventional risk assessment 
fails to account for these populations’ cumulative exposure to several 
different pollutants and to nonchemical stressors as well.11 Analyzing 
 
7 Id. at 5, 12 (“Under the traditional paradigm, the question has been, ‘What are the 
probability and consequence of an adverse health (or ecologic) effect posed by the signal?’ 
In contrast, the recommended framework asks, implicitly, ‘What options are there to 
reduce hazards or exposures that have been identified, and how can risk assessment be 
used to evaluate the merits of the various options?’”). 
8 See id. at 213. 
9 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, ENSURING RISK 
REDUCTION IN COMMUNITIES WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
AND CUMULATIVE RISKS/IMPACTS 11–13 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov 
/compliance/ej/resources/publications/nejac/nejac-cum-risk-rpt-122104.pdf. The EPA 
defines “environmental justice” as the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and 
policies. See Environmental Justice, Basic Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
environmentaljustice/basics/index.html (last updated May 24, 2012). See generally Stella 
M. Čapek, The “Environmental Justice” Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and an 
Application, 40 SOC. PROBS. 5 (1993). 
10 EPA, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: INTERIM GUIDANCE ON 
CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION 8 
(2010) [hereinafter EPA, ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS], available at http://www.epa 
.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/considering-ej-in-rulemaking-guide-07-2010.pdf. 
11 Id. 
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cumulative risks from multiple stressors allows a more realistic 
evaluation of a population’s risk from pollutants than does assessing 
risks from a single source or stressor.12 
The EPA’s shift from a narrow focus on single stressors, endpoints, 
sources, pathways, and environmental media to a broad focus on 
multiples of these factors has resulted in a continuing, if uneven, 
transition to the use of cumulative risk assessment as a methodology 
to determine probable cumulative effects.13 The EPA has publicly 
embraced and encouraged the transition in Administrator 
announcements dating back to 1995,14 in both the 2010 Interim 
Guidance on Considering Environmental Justice During the 
Development of an Action (Interim Guidance), issued by the EPA 
Administrator,15 and in the 2011 EPA Office of General Counsel 
document, Plan EJ 2014: Legal Tools (EJ Legal Tools).16 Addressed 
to the EPA program managers, the Interim Guidance states that 
managers should consider cumulative effects in Agency action that 
may affect environmental justice populations.17 The EJ Legal Tools 
document provides an overview of several discretionary legal 
authorities that are or may be available to the EPA to address 
environmental justice considerations under federal statutes and 
programs, including CAA programs.18 However, because the EPA has 
often faced legal challenges alleging that the Agency is overreaching, 
the EPA program offices may hesitate to apply a broad interpretation 
of the Agency’s public health statutory authority. The Agency might 
anticipate such challenges in the context of considering a broad 
construct of cumulative effects in CAA program decisions, because 
none of the CAA legislative provisions specifically mention 
considering background pollutants or non-chemical stressors.19 
 
12 Id. 
13 Callahan & Sexton, supra note 3, at 804; see generally EPA, ACTION DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS, supra note 10, at 8; EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 3, at 72. 
14 See Callahan & Sexton, supra note 3, at 804 (quoting various EPA announcements). 
15 EPA, ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 10. 
16 EPA, PLAN EJ 2014: LEGAL TOOLS (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/ej/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014/plan-ej-2011-09.pdf. 
17 EPA, ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 10, at 8. 
18 EPA, supra note 16, at 1. 
19 In this article, “cumulative effects” refers to the qualitative and quantitative impacts 
from exposure to multiple chemical and non-chemical stressors—including the effects on  
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Nevertheless, given the broad statutory mandates in the CAA to 
protect the public health, and the judicial principle of deference to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous legislative language, 
it seems plausible that the Agency could make a legally defensible 
assertion that its CAA authority permits the EPA to consider 
cumulative risk assessment in setting permissible emission limitations 
and establishing policies for permit determinations.20 
This Article examines court decisions reviewing the EPA’s 
exercise of authority in CAA rulemakings and published Agency 
administrative and policy decisions to support a case for EPA 
authority to engage in cumulative risk-based decision making under 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), National 
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs), and 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) programs. Although 
there are many other CAA programmatic decisions (both relating to 
standard setting and permitting) for which the EPA could also 
incorporate cumulative effects or cumulative risk issues, the analysis 
in this article is limited to these three program areas where the 
Agency’s exercise of CAA authority is challenged most often.21 We 
begin with a brief overview of risk assessment. 
I 
HOW THE EPA USES RISK ASSESSMENT 
At its most general, quantified risk assessment involves the 
evaluation of scientific information on the hazardous properties of 
environmental agents, the extent of human exposure to those agents, 
and the risks of adverse effects (human health or ecological effects) 
 
the ecological environment, on human health, or both. This broad term includes (but is not 
limited to) cumulative exposures, cumulative risks, and measurable cumulative impacts. In 
this article, cumulative risk assessment methodology was chosen as the paradigm for the 
analysis because it provides a concrete example of a methodology with which to discuss 
hypothetical court review of an EPA decision. 
20 Given the uncertainties inherent in risk assessment methodologies and consequent 
outputs, even if the EPA has authority to base decisions on cumulative risk assessment 
methods and data, there remains the challenge of demonstrating the rationality both of the 
approach itself and the use of the analytical results. For a discussion of the judicial 
framework for analyzing the rationality of agency decision making based on the scientific 
uncertainty inherent in risk assessment, see Sarah Alves, Joan Tilghman, Arlene 
Rosenbaum & Devon C. Payne-Sturges, U.S. EPA Authority to Use Cumulative Risk 
Assessments in Environmental Decision-Making, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 
1997 (2012). 
21 For a discussion of other CAA program decisions under which the EPA might 
consider cumulative effects or cumulative risk, see EPA, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
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associated with the exposure.22 The product of the evaluation is a 
statement regarding the probability, expressed quantitatively or 
qualitatively, that populations so exposed will be harmed, and to what 
degree.23 Essentially, risk assessment is the process that leads to a 
characterization of risk.24 “[The] EPA considers risk to be the chance 
of harmful effects to human health or to ecological systems resulting 
from exposure to an environmental stressor.”25 
An EPA risk assessment typically follows four basic steps: 
(1) Hazard Identification. First, the EPA examines whether a 
stressor has the potential to cause harm to humans and/or 
ecological systems, and if so, under what circumstances. 
(2) Dose-Response Assessment. The EPA then examines the 
numerical relationship between exposures and effects. 
(3) Exposure Assessment. The EPA then examines what is known 
about the frequency, timing, and levels of contact with a 
stressor. 
(4) Risk Characterization. Finally, the EPA summarizes and 
integrates information from the proceeding steps of the risk 
assessment to synthesize an overall conclusion about the 
nature and presence or absence of risk.26 
Cumulative risk assessment is a type of risk assessment that the 
NRC defines as “analysis, characterization, and possible 
quantification of the combined risks to health or the environment 
posed by multiple agents or stressors.”27 According to NRC, these 
stressors may be chemical, biologic, radiologic, physical, or 
psychologic.28 Further, these stressors may be quantitative or 
 
22 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 26; AM. 
BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 354. 
23 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 26; AM. 
BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 354. 
24 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 15. 
25 EPA, supra note 1. 
26 Human Health Risk Assessment, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/riskassessment/health      
-risk.htm (last updated July 31, 2012); Risk Assessment: Step 4–Risk Characterization, 
EPA, http://epa.gov/riskassessment/risk-characterization.htm (last updated July 31, 2012). 
Note that these steps are conducted after a planning and scoping stage. 
27 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 213 
(citing EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3). 
28 Id. at 213 (citing Callahan & Sexton, supra note 3). 
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qualitative elements of an analysis, based on the complexity and 
context of the decision at issue.29 Thus, a risk assessment may be 
cumulative even if it lacks a quantitative analysis of all relevant non-
chemical stressors.30 For example, the EPA’s Office of Pesticide 
Programs and Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response 
conduct cumulative risk assessments to aid in decisions about 
pesticide regulation and Superfund sites, respectively.31 However, 
these offices generally do not consider non-chemical stressors in 
cumulative risk assessments.32 
Because risk assessments are based on methodologies that 
necessarily involve a series of assumptions that are estimated to best 
reflect the understanding of real-world conditions, the analysis will 
inevitably contain some amount of uncertainty. On its website, the 
EPA states, 
In the ideal world, all risk assessments would be based on a very 
strong knowledge base (i.e., reliable and complete data on the 
nature and extent of contamination, fate and transport processes, the 
magnitude and frequency of human and ecological exposure, and 
the inherent toxicity of all of the chemicals). However, in real life, 
information is usually limited on one or more of these key data 
needed for risk assessment calculations. This means that risk 
assessors often have to make estimates and use judgment when 
performing risk calculations, and consequently all risk estimates are 
uncertain to some degree. For this reason, a key part of all good risk 
assessments is a fair and open presentation of the uncertainties in 
the calculations and a characterization of how reliable (or how 
unreliable) the resulting risk estimates really are.33 
The EPA policy makers use the information developed through risk 
assessments to help decide how to protect humans and the 
environment from stressors or pollutants. Although the value and 
relevance of risk assessments have been questioned, the NRC asserts 
 
29 Id. at 215. 
30 Id. at 217–19. 
31 See Pesticides: Health and Safety, Assessing Pesticide Cumulative Risk, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/cumulative/ (last updated May 9, 2012); RCRA Risk 
Assessment: Ecological: Planning and Scoping, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oswer/ 
riskassessment/rcra_eco_planning.htm (last updated Dec. 24, 2012). 
32 See Pesticides: Health and Safety, Cumulative Risk Assessment Methods and Tools, 
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/cumulative/methods_tools.htm#guidance (last updated 
May 9, 2012); EPA, SCIENCE POLICY COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON CUMULATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT. PART 1. PLANNING AND SCOPING (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
osa/spc/pdfs/cumrisk2.pdf. 
33 EPA, supra note 1. 
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that risk assessment remains an appropriate method for measuring the 
relative benefits of the many possible interventions available to 
improve human health.34 
II 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE EPA INTERPRETATION OF CLEAN AIR 
ACT AUTHORITY 
A. The Chevron Framework 
To survive a legal challenge to a decision under a CAA program 
that the EPA has justified by relying, in part, on the results of a 
cumulative risk assessment, the Agency must make two showings: (1) 
that its CAA statutory authority permits considering such an analysis 
as a factor in the EPA’s decision; and (2) that the EPA acted 
rationally in the exercise of this authority. As noted above, this article 
will focus on the first of these inquiries.35 That is, how have courts 
examined assertions of authority to interpret broad statutory mandates 
in the CAA to permit the EPA to consider unspecified factors in 
decision making (such as cumulative risk assessment)? 
In reviewing a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute it 
implements, courts analyze the issue under the framework laid out in 
the 1984 Supreme Court decision, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council (Chevron).36 In Chevron, the Supreme 
Court created a two-part framework for reviewing agency 
interpretations in such circumstances. First, a reviewing court must 
examine statutory language to decide whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the statute is clear, the court 
“must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress,” and strike down any conflicting agency interpretation 
(Chevron Step One).37 However, if the relevant statutory terms do not 
 
34 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 15. 
35 The authors acknowledge that courts often intertwine the two questions. See Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (explaining that 
where Congress has not spoken on an issue, courts must give controlling weight to an 
agency’s legislative regulations “unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute”); Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(discussing the “overlap” between the Chevron and Administrative Procedure Act’s 
arbitrary-and-capricious tests). 
36 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
37 Id. at 842–43. 
ALVES (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2014  1:37 PM 
160 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 28, 151 
unambiguously resolve the issue, courts must defer to the agency’s 
interpretation as long as it is a “permissible” or reasonable one 
(Chevron Step Two).38 
FIGURE 1. Chevron test—two-part framework for resolving agency 
interpretations of statutes.39 
 
Under Chevron Step One, the court analyzes the relevant statute 
and determines whether Congress has unambiguously either banned 
or required what the agency proposes to do.40 If a court does find a 
statute ambiguous under Chevron Step One, it must defer to any 
reasonable agency interpretation under Chevron Step Two. In 
Chevron, the Supreme Court explained that the power of an 
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created 
program “necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the 
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by 
Congress.”41 In fact, the “agency’s interpretation need not be the only 
 
38 Id. at 842–45. 
39 See Alves et al., supra note 20, at 2004. 
40 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1667 
(2001) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). 
41 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
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permissible reading of the statute, nor the interpretation that the court 
might have originally given the statute.”42 
Chevron suggests that if an agency interprets its enabling statute to 
permit making a policy decision rationally based on some factor or 
analysis that the applicable federal statute did not specifically prohibit 
the agency from considering (e.g., cumulative risk assessment), a 
court would not overturn the decision simply because of reliance on 
the unstated factor or analysis.43 For example, courts have made clear 
that agencies may consider substitute risks of proposed regulations 
(e.g., “‘risk-risk’ or ‘health-health’ tradeoffs [that] arise when 
regulation of one health problem gives rise to another health 
problem”), even where the statute the agency is implementing does 
not direct the agency to consider tradeoffs.44 Courts have also often 
found it permissible for agencies to consider cost factors in 
promulgating decisions where the statute does not mention cost or 
feasibility.45 Although the EPA use of cumulative risk assessment is a 
different issue, the point here is that courts have repeatedly found that 
in implementing a statue charged to its discretion, an agency has 
authority to consider criteria not mentioned in that statute. 
Some EPA offices may hesitate to use cumulative risk assessment 
in program decision making where the Agency previously has not 
 
42 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843). 
43 See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 1667–68, 1676–78 (The Sunstein article analyzes 
case law mainly relating to agency consideration of cost, and concludes that to achieve 
regulatory goals—for example, to allocate resources so that they save more lives or 
produce a cleaner environment—regulators must often take account of all of a proposed 
regulation’s adverse effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious and 
disproportionate public harm. Therefore, the author concludes that courts should read 
silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, 
rational consideration of all consequences of regulation); See id. at 1652 (citing Whitman 
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 490 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment)) (Although the Sunstein article addresses an agency’s 
discretion to consider cost where a statute is silent, the analysis can be analogized, in part, 
to an agency’s considering cumulative risk assessment results where a statute is silent as to 
risk.) 
44 See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 1672–74 (citing Symposium, Risk-risk Analysis, 8 J. 
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994)); Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 F.2d 321 
(D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
45 See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 1676–78 (citing Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 
(D.C. Cir. 2000); George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Grand 
Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
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considered cumulative risks in implementing that program. However, 
Chevron Step Two deference to reasonable agency interpretations 
applies even where an agency changes its interpretation of a statute 
(e.g., the EPA asserting that a broad statutory directive permits it to 
rely on some factor not named in the statute, when the Agency had 
not relied on that factor in past action under that authority).46 In such 
a circumstance, the court might question a reinterpretation if the 
earlier one received court approval47 or appears to be more consistent 
with other congressional and agency action.48 However, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that agency interpretations of their substantive 
authorities are mutable, and thus may be changed when appropriate.49 
In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated, “An initial agency 
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the 
agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying 
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”50 
Therefore, judicial deference to reasonable EPA interpretations 
under Chevron Step Two extends not only to the EPA’s initially 
selected interpretation, but also to subsequent decisions to change its 
preferred interpretation.51 In such cases, the court would apply the 
 
46 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64 (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly 
carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must 
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”). 
47 See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990) 
(explaining that “once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that 
determination . . . and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our 
prior determination of the statute’s meaning”). 
48 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 138–39 (2000) 
(refusing to find FDA authority to regulate cigarettes under the Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA) because Congress had directly addressed the problem of tobacco and health 
through other legislation, and had otherwise foreclosed the removal of tobacco products 
from the market, even though the FDCA could arguably be interpreted as requiring FDA 
to ban cigarettes). 
49 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64 (Note that under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) the EPA must provide adequate notice of and opportunity to comment on such a 
methodology change); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2013). 
50 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64. 
51 See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (“Sudden and 
unexplained change . . . ‘may be arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.’ But if 
[this pitfall is] avoided, change is not invalidating.”) (citations omitted); Greater Bost. 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“An agency’s view of what 
is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in circumstances.”); 
New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 22–27 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding the EPA’s change to a 
longstanding interpretation of what constitutes “increases” in emissions under the New 
Source Review program where the EPA supported its conclusions “with ‘detailed and  
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presumption that when Congress left an ambiguity in a statute meant 
for implementation by an agency, Congress understood that the 
implementing agency—not the reviewing court—would have 
discretion to resolve the ambiguity.52 A court is most likely to uphold 
the EPA’s interpretation of its broad CAA authority as permitting 
consideration of cumulative effects derived from a cumulative risk 
assessment methodology where the EPA has strong scientific 
evidence to support the assertion that cumulative effects are a 
significant concern in the circumstance at issue.53 However, assuming 
that a court would uphold the EPA’s interpretation or reinterpretation 
of an ambiguous statutory provision to permit the consideration of the 
results of a cumulative risk assessment, there remains a further legal 
hurdle. A challenger could still assert that even assuming the Agency 
had authority to use the methodology and results of the analysis, there 
were flaws in the conduct of the analysis itself or in the use of the 
results. In such a case, the EPA must show that there was a “rational 
basis” for its decision—that its actions were not “arbitrary and 
capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).54 
B. APA “Arbitrary and Capricious” Review 
As noted above, the EPA often supports its decision making by 
estimating risks associated with various pollutants or stressors. 
Assuming a court has found that the EPA has authority to consider 
cumulative risk in an ambiguous CAA directive, how might a court 
assess whether there is a rational basis for using a particular 
cumulative risk assessment methodology and the results deriving 
from it? This inquiry is particularly important given that the product 
of any risk assessment is a qualitative or quantitative statement 
regarding the probability of, and degree to which exposed populations 
or systems will be harmed.55 In other words, how does the EPA 
survive the arbitrary and capricious test when it employs a 
methodology that necessarily involves a series of assumptions which 
 
reasoned’ analysis based on its experience and expertise” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
865)). 
52 See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740–41 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). 
53 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 378. 
54 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–559, 701–706 (2011). 
55 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 354; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE 
AND JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 26. 
ALVES (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2014  1:37 PM 
164 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 28, 151 
are estimated to best reflect the Agency’s understanding of real-world 
conditions and inevitably contain some amount of uncertainty?56 
The APA provides the basic framework within which federal 
agencies must operate in promulgating rules, issuing policy 
statements, and adjudicating rights.57 Under this statute, a court may 
assess the validity of regulatory agency decision making, and “hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found 
to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”58 In applying this arbitrary and capricious 
standard, a court must conduct a searching and careful review of the 
agency’s record.59 The court will find an agency decision arbitrary 
and capricious if: 
[T]he agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended 
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.60 
Although the APA requires courts to perform a “searching and 
careful” inquiry into the facts underlying the agency’s decisions, 
courts will, “presume the validity of agency action as long as ‘a 
rational basis for it is presented.’”61 Courts generally give an “extreme 
degree of deference to [an] agency [that] is evaluating scientific data 
within its technical expertise,” reviewing the agency’s action to 
“ensure that [the agency] has examined the relevant data and has 
articulated an adequate explanation for its action.”62 Indeed, most 
courts will grant an agency considerable deference for its “scientific 
procedures as long as there has been sufficient evidence in the record 
and sufficient explanation for the action, even though different 
inferences might have been drawn from the same data and theories 
and even though courts themselves sometimes suggest they might 
have drawn different conclusions.”63 
 
56 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 19. 
57 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–559, 701–706. 
58 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
59 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
60 Id. 
61 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
62 City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
63 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 377. 
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In cases where courts have explained and illuminated the scope of 
judicial review in the face of administrative decision making where, 
as in the case of cumulative risk assessment, the process contains 
inherent technical judgment and complexity, it is apparent that a court 
will find an EPA decision arbitrary and capricious if the EPA fails to 
show a rational relationship between its conclusions or assumptions 
and the evidence before the Agency as contained in the record.64 That 
is, challengers tend to succeed when the record under review shows 
data gaps or missing steps in the EPA’s logic that preclude 
meaningful review of the EPA’s decision-making process.65 In 
contrast, when a stakeholder challenges the quality of the data or 
technical process relied on by the EPA or suggests that other data is 
more persuasive, courts are likely to defer to the EPA’s expertise and 
uphold the final agency action.66 
 
64 See Nw. Coal. for Alt. to Pesticides v. EPA, 544 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting the EPA’s choice of safety factor as arbitrary where the court was unable to 
determine whether there was reliable data supporting the Agency’s choice of that factor; 
finding that the EPA failed to explain the connection between the toxicological data and 
the safety factor selected); Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1243 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (remanding an EPA determination to use vinyl chloride as a surrogate for 
other hazardous air pollutants because the court could not assess the rationality of the 
Agency’s analysis, because the EPA failed to memorialize evidence of the correlation the 
Agency claimed existed between vinyl chloride and the other pollutants in the record). 
65 David T. Buente Jr. et al., Limited Oversight: The Role of the Federal Courts Vis-à-
Vis the Environmental Protection Agency in Air Pollution Control Under the Clean Air 
Act, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 309, 318–19 (2011). 
66 See Coal. of Battery Recyclers Ass’n v. EPA, 604 F.3d 613, 618–19 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(upholding EPA’s shift in focus from blood lead levels in the original 1978 lead NAAQS 
to IQ decrements in children in the revised lead NAAQS, noting that the EPA explained in 
both the proposed and final rule that current scientific evidence no longer recognized a 
safe blood level for lead, that epidemiological studies of cognitive effects and lead 
exposure commonly used IQ scores, and that the scientific literature supported the 
conclusion that lead exposure causes IQ loss in children); Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. 
Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding the Department of Interior’s 
assessment of threats to a lizard’s habitat in its decision not to list the species as threatened 
under the Endangered Species Act; explaining that the merits of the challengers’ and the 
agency’s conflicting scientific studies are not a proper subject for the court to resolve; 
citing a 1989 Supreme Court opinion explaining that when specialists express conflicting 
views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own 
qualified experts even if a court might find contrary views more persuasive) (citing Marsh 
v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) and Nw. Ecosystem Alliance vs. 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007)); Miami-Dade Cnty. v. 
EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1063–71 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding the EPA’s Underground 
Injection Control Program rule against challenges that the rule’s risk assessment both 
underestimated and overestimated risks; explaining that the court was obligated to uphold  
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Given the inherent scientific judgment in the selection of data and 
assumptions at various steps of a risk assessment, a court will attempt 
to ensure that the EPA “performed the most rigorous analysis possible 
given the available data.”67 If the data and assumptions upon which a 
cumulative risk assessment is based are such that a reasonable policy-
maker could not interpret the results of the risk assessment with 
reasonable confidence that those results bear a rational relation to the 
real world (i.e., if the uncertainty of the risk assessment findings is 
too high), a court would likely find it inappropriate to consider such 
health effects in agency decision making.68 This is because a court 
will overturn an agency decision where the agency fails to provide 
sufficient information to demonstrate a rational connection between 
the factors the agency examined and the conclusions it reached.69 A 
plausible way for the EPA to demonstrate this rational connection, 
i.e., to show that its use of results from a cumulative risk assessment 
was not arbitrary and capricious is to present evidence that the 
cumulative risk assessment was based on reasonable methodologies 
and assumptions, given the available data, and that the EPA’s use of 
the risk assessment results were reasonable based on the analysis.70 
 
the EPA’s technical judgment where the assumptions the EPA applied in its risk 
assessment methodology bore a rational relationship to the real world, given the 
incomplete information faced by the Agency). 
67 See Miami-Dade Cnty., 529 F.3d at 1069–70. 
68 See Nw. Coal. for Alt. to Pesticides, 544 F.3d at 1052 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wright, J., 
dissenting)) (“Although the ultimate scope may be narrow, the depth must be sufficient for 
us to be able to comprehend the agency’s handling of the evidence cited or relied upon. 
The purpose of this in-depth review is to educate ourselves so that we can properly 
perform our reviewing function: determining whether the agency’s conclusions are 
rationally supported. For, although data interpretation and analysis are functions that often 
lie within an agency’s realm of expertise, it is our duty to review those functions to 
ascertain whether the agency’s actions were complete, reasoned, and adequately explained. 
The mere fact that an agency is operating in a field of its expertise does not excuse us from 
our customary review responsibilities. And, where the agency’s reasoning, although 
complex, is rational, clear, and complete, we must affirm. Contrarily, where the agency’s 
reasoning is irrational, unclear, or not supported by the data it purports to interpret, we 
must disapprove the agency’s action.”). 
69 For example, in Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. EPA, the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the EPA’s choice of a safety factor as arbitrary where the 
court was unable to determine whether there was reliable data supporting the Agency’s 
choice of that factor. The court found that the EPA failed to explain the connection 
between the toxicological data and the safety factor selected. See Nw. Coal. for Alt. to 
Pesticides, 544 F.3d at 1052. 
70 Court cases that have addressed challenges to the EPA risk assessments confirm this 
understanding. In Miami-Dade County v. EPA, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld  
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Decision makers should be mindful that courts often probe deeply 
into the science and reason underlying an agency’s decision when a 
challenger asserts that a choice of methodologies or studies was 
unreasonable, or that the agency failed to consider a plausible 
alternative.71 Therefore, if a stakeholder challenges the EPA’s use of a 
 
the EPA’s use of conservative risk assessment assumptions as a means to address 
uncertainties. The court found these assumptions to represent a legitimate discretionary 
decision-making methodology because it was rational for the EPA to err on the side of 
overprotection when faced with data uncertainties. 529 F.3d at 1069–70 (citing West 
Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 866–67 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that “deference is due 
to an agency’s modeling of complex phenomena, so long as ‘model assumptions . . . have 
a ‘rational relationship’ to the real world’”); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 
993 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (finding that the EPA was “reasonable” in using human 
health uncertainty factors in a risk assessment where the factors were created as a function 
of the available data. “[I]t is within EPA’s discretion to decide that in the wake of 
uncertainty, it would be better to give the values a conservative bent rather than err on the 
other side.”); New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). In multiple 
decisions, courts have noted that “the law does not require selection of the single best 
methodology in any case, but only a study based on consideration of the relevant factors 
and in the construction of which there has been no clear error of judgment.” Miami-Dade 
Cnty., 529 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotes omitted) (citing Citizens to Pres. Overland Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 
430 U.S. 99, 99 (1977)). 
 Conservative risk assumptions are those that err on the side of overstating risk under 
conditions of uncertainty. For example, where there is a known probability distribution, 
using a conservative assumption might involve selecting a risk estimate at the 95th 
percentile—meaning there is a 95 percent chance that the actual risk is overestimated and 
only a 5 percent chance that it is underestimated. See Ralph M. Perhac, Jr., Comment: 
Does Risk Aversion Make a Case for Conservatism?, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 
297 (1996), available at http://ipmall.info/risk/vol7/fall/perhac.htm. 
71 See Hapner v. Tidwell, 621 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Nw. Coal. For 
Alt.to Pesticides v. EPA, 544 F.3d 1043, 1052 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008)) (“Although the ultimate 
scope [of our review] may be narrow, the depth must be sufficient for us to be able to 
comprehend the agency’s handling of the evidence cited or relied upon.”); Am. Farm 
Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (“An 
agency’s failure adequately to consider a relevant and significant aspect of a problem may 
render its rulemaking arbitrary and capricious . . . . [The] agency must examine the 
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.”); Leather Indus. of 
Am., Inc. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (examining the EPA’s risk 
assessment, and finding the Agency’s choice of conservative exposure pathway on which 
to base the standard insufficiently supported); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 
1201 (1991) (invalidating asbestos rule under the Toxic Substances Control Act holding 
that the EPA presented insufficient evidence to justify its asbestos ban on two grounds: the 
failure of the Agency to consider all necessary evidence and its failure to calculate risk 
levels for intermediate levels of regulation); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 
905, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (agency must provide a full analytic defense when its model is 
challenged). 
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cumulative risk assessment methodology when making a decision to 
set standards “requisite to protect the public health,” the Agency must 
be able to show that it rationally determined from the available data 
that it should consider cumulative risks to implement the statutory 
mandate effectively.72 Such an interpretation of a broad public health 
mandate arguably would be reasonable in light of compelling 
scientific evidence of a cumulative adverse health effect.73 One could 
argue that where new scientific evidence indicates a different 
approach from the longstanding one that would better serve a 
statutory mandate, federal agencies should change their standard-
setting methodology.74 
 
72 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 378. As an example of scientific complexities 
that impede using cumulative risk assessment in decision making, the default assumption 
for cancer is that risk is additive, but that is not strictly true because different carcinogens 
have different modes of action. Similarly, to examine risks from multiple chemicals that 
have non-cancer health effects and to be able to add the exposures together it is necessary 
to identify chemicals with common impacts. Moreover, taking into account background 
levels of emissions of other pollutants from source types other than the one being 
analyzed, and the potential for emissions to increase up to their permitted levels, adds to 
the complexity and thus the uncertainty in a risk assessment, which may be a large part of 
the reason that the EPA would hesitate to base a decision on such a risk assessment. 
Although several regional cumulative risk studies for HAPs have been conducted in recent 
years, it would be more difficult to apply the complex methodology to a category of 
emission sources that are dispersed throughout multiple regions. See S. COAST AIR 
QUALITY MGMT DIST., FINAL REPORT: MULTIPLE AIR TOXICS EXPOSURE STUDY IN THE 
SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN (2008), available at http://www.aqmd.gov/prdas/matesIII/ 
matesIII.html; OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PORTLAND AIR TOXICS ASSESSMENT 
(2006), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/aq/toxics/pata.htm. 
73 See Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)) (noting that courts 
must defer to an agency’s interpretation of complex scientific data, and that “[w]hen 
specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the 
reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court 
might find contrary views more persuasive”); Miami-Dade Cnty., 529 F.3d at 1063 
(citations omitted) (explaining that “in the context of environmental litigation and 
otherwise, ‘a determination of endangerment to public health is necessarily a question of 
policy that [must be supported by] an assessment of risks and that should not be bound by 
either the procedural or the substantive rigor proper for questions of fact’”). 
74 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (explaining that 
while an “agency must show that there are good reasons for a new policy . . . it need not 
demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the 
reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that 
there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the 
conscious change of course adequately indicates”); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not 
instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, 
must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing 
basis.”); see Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 900 F.2d 208, 212 (9th  
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The remainder of this article will examine the statutory mandates 
in two CAA standards-setting programs to suggest how a court might 
analyze the Agency’s interpretation of the applicable CAA provisions 
to permit cumulative risk decision making. We then examine the 
EPA’s authority to assess cumulative effects in the context of 
deciding whether to permit a new source in an attainment area—a 
subject of particular currency in the environmental justice context. 
Note that although this article presents what we believe are legally 
permissible interpretations of EPA authority, using cumulative risk 
assessment in the contexts described here may be out of the ordinary, 
and could involve legal and policy interpretations that veer from 
longstanding interpretations of the Agency’s program legislation and 
regulations. Broad use of cumulative risk assessment as the basis for 
EPA decision making will require considering a mix of scientific, 
political, financial, human resource, and other factors. 
III 
SPECIFIC OPPORTUNITIES TO CONSIDER CUMULATIVE EFFECTS 
IN THREE EPA CLEAN AIR ACT PROGRAMS 
A. The Clean Air Act: A Brief Overview 
The CAA is the law that defines the EPA’s responsibilities for 
protecting and improving the nation’s air quality and the stratospheric 
ozone layer.75 The CAA directs the EPA to regulate air pollutant 
emissions through a combination of regulatory programs. For 
instance, it requires the EPA to set health-based standards for ambient 
(outdoor) air quality.76 These are known as the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS). The CAA also requires the EPA to set 
 
Cir. 1990) (explaining that “federal agencies have the power to ‘adjust . . . policies and 
rulings in light of experience’” (quoting Mont. Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334, 347 (9th 
Cir. 1979)). In fact, cumulative risk and cumulative impacts research is currently a very 
active area, and the EPA has developed and implemented a screening-level cumulative risk 
modeling approach for prioritizing HAPs and HAP emission sources for further research. 
See 2005 National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/nata2005/ (last 
updated May 21, 2012). In addition, states such as California are developing cumulative 
impact studies based on national research models. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
CUMULATIVE IMPACTS: BUILDING A SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION (2010), available at 
http://oehha.ca.gov/ej/pdf/CIReport123110.pdf. 
75 See Air and Radiation, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/ (last updated July 16, 
2012). 
76 See Clean Air Act §§ 108, 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409. 
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national emission standards for mobile sources of air pollution, such 
as automobiles and their fuels.77 The Act also mandates emission 
controls for the sources of 187 hazardous pollutants embodied in the 
Federal National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(NESHAPs).78 The CAA establishes a comprehensive permit system 
for all major sources of air pollution, and requires the prevention of 
significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality in areas with clean air 
via the PSD permitting program.79 State, tribal, and local air agencies 
also play a role in CAA implementation in that the EPA authorizes 
state-run implementation programs that meet certain minimum 
requirements.80 Under the CAA, each state must develop a State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) that outlines how each state will control 
air pollution under the CAA.81 If a state fails to submit a SIP or to 
revise a SIP as required by the EPA, the CAA requires the EPA to 
create a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for that state.82 
Relevant to this article, the NAAQS provisions of the CAA require 
the EPA to set limits for air pollutants that endanger public health or 
welfare, and that are present in ambient air as a result of emissions 
from numerous or diverse sources.83 These six common air pollutants, 
known as “criteria pollutants,” are particulate matter, ground-level 
ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and lead.84 In 
contrast, the NESHAP provisions of the CAA direct the EPA to set 
emissions standards for specific sources that emit “hazardous air 
pollutants” (also known as toxic air pollutants or air toxics).85 
“Hazardous air pollutants . . . are those pollutants that cause or may 
cause cancer or other serious health effects, such as reproductive 
effects or birth defects, or adverse environmental and ecological 
effects.”86 The PSD program requires new and modified major 
 
77 JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30853, CLEAN AIR ACT: 
A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30853.pdf. 
78 See Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1); Pollutants and Sources, EPA, 
http://epa.gov/ttn/atw/pollsour.html (last updated Sept. 18, 2013). 
79 See Clean Air Act § 165, 42 U.S.C. § 7475. 
80 See Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. § 7410(c)(1). 
83 See Clean Air Act §§ 108, 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409. 
84 See What Are the Six Common Air Pollutants?, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/air/ 
urbanair/ (last updated Apr. 20, 2012). 
85 Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
86 EPA, supra note 78. 
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sources of air pollution in clean air areas (“attainment areas”) to apply 
for a PSD permit which, when granted, contains emissions limits and 
other specifications the permitting authority determines are necessary 
to prevent NAAQS violations and protect air quality.87 The remainder 
of this article discusses the specific requirements of these programs, 
and analyzes how a reviewing court might assess the EPA’s assertion 
of authority to consider cumulative risk in decision making under 
each program. 
B. National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
The EPA must establish NAAQS for an air pollutant upon findings 
by the Administrator that the pollutant endangers public health or 
welfare, and that the pollutant’s presence in ambient air results from 
numerous or diverse sources.88 For each such pollutant, the Agency 
must establish primary NAAQS that are “requisite to protect the 
public health” while “allowing an adequate margin of safety.”89 The 
Agency also must set secondary NAAQS “requisite to protect the 
public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects 
associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient 
air.”90 Effects adverse to public welfare include visibility impairment 
and damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings.91 
1. Air Quality Criteria 
To establish NAAQS for an air pollutant, the EPA must publish 
and revise air quality criteria,92 which must reflect the latest scientific 
 
87 See Clean Air Act § 165, 42 U.S.C. § 7475; Pacific Southwest, Region 9, Air 
Permits, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/permit/psd-public-part.html (last updated 
Aug. 6, 2013). 
88 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(a)–(b). 
89 Id. § 7409(b)(1). 
90 Id. § 7409(b)(2). 
91 Technology Transfer Network National Ambient Air Quality Standards, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/ (last updated June 13, 2013). Welfare effects as defined in 
section 302(h) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)), include, but are not limited to, “effects 
on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, 
visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to 
transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-
being.” 
92 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2). The NAAQS are based on the air quality criteria developed 
by the EPA. Primary NAAQS are the “standards the attainment and maintenance of which 
in the judgment of the Administrator, based on [the relevant air quality] criteria and  
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knowledge useful in recognizing identifiable effects on public health 
or welfare that may be expected from that pollutant’s presence in the 
ambient air in varying quantities.93 
To the extent practicable, the criteria for an air pollutant must 
include “variable factors (including atmospheric conditions) which of 
themselves or in combination . . . may alter [a pollutant’s] effects on 
public health or welfare”; “the types of air pollutants which, when 
present in the atmosphere, may interact with such pollutant to produce 
an adverse effect on public health or welfare”; and “any known or 
anticipated adverse effects on welfare.”94 The CAA also states, “[a]ll 
language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, 
effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, 
animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate . . . whether caused 
by transformation, conversion, or combination with other air 
pollutants.”95 This statutory language describes the effects the EPA 
must consider when it sets NAAQS, and provides the EPA with 
authority to include cumulative effects and multimedia exposure 
when the Agency establishes air quality criteria for a particular air 
pollutant.96 Because a rational reading of this language demonstrates 
that Congress recognized a pollutant’s effect on public health and 
welfare may be altered by other pollutants in the atmosphere, the EPA 
might use this provision as authority for considering cumulative 
effects of multiple pollutants when setting the NAAQS for an air 
pollutant.97 
 
allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.” 42 
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). Secondary NAAQS “specify a level of air quality the attainment and 
maintenance of which . . . is requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or 
anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of [the listed] air pollutant in the 
ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2). 
93 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2). Every five years, the EPA must complete a review of air 
quality criteria and the NAAQS, and revise the NAAQS as appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 
7409(d)(1). 
94 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
95 Clean Air Act § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h). 
96 See ENVTL. LAW INST., OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. EPA STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 107 (2001) [hereinafter 
ELI, OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/reports/annual-project-reports/eli        
-opportunities4ej.pdf; Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental 
Justice into EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 617, 632 (1999). 
97 See ELI, OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 
96, at 107. 
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Although the statutory language quoted in the preceding paragraph 
directs the EPA to consider how other air pollutants combine with the 
relevant air pollutant to effect public health and welfare,98 it is not 
clear whether this instruction also provides authority for the Agency 
to consider the cumulative public health effects of the air pollutant 
with other, non-air pollutants. Nor is it clear whether these air quality 
criteria statutory directives permit the EPA to consider the effects 
arising from a combination of the effects of non-chemical stressors 
(e.g., poverty) and an air pollutant. 
On the one hand, when setting NAAQS, the EPA must consider an 
air pollutant’s impacts on vulnerable subpopulations, such as children 
and asthmatics.99 Therefore, the EPA arguably should consider any 
non-chemical stressor that exacerbates the adverse health effects of an 
air pollutant on these populations. Further, the air quality criteria on 
which NAAQS are based must include “variable factors (including 
atmospheric conditions) which of themselves or in combination . . . 
may alter [a pollutant’s] effects on public health or welfare.”100 The 
EPA could reasonably argue that non-air pollutants and non-chemical 
stressors are factors that alter a pollutant’s effects. 
On the other hand, one could argue that because the statutory 
language references cumulative effects of multiple air pollutants, 
 
98 Each breath of air contains a mixture of a variety of particles and gases, and these 
particles and gases can and do interact. As [the] EPA summarized in the recent ozone 
criteria document, “[h]ealth effects caused by the complex mixture are undoubtedly 
different (either subtly or significantly) from the additive effects of a few of the 
hundreds of compounds present.” Deborah Behles, Examining the Air We Breathe: 
EPA Should Evaluate Cumulative Impacts When It Promulgates National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 200, 215 (2010) (quoting EPA, AIR 
QUALITY CRITERIA FOR OZONE AND RELATED PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTS 5–65 
(2006), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=149923); 
see also EPA, INTEGRATED SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR OZONE AND RELATED 
PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTS (THIRD EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT) 4-17 (2012), 
available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/ recordisplay.cfm?deid=242490. 
99 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 524–25 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing 
Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that “NAAQS must 
protect not only average healthy individuals, but also ‘sensitive citizens’—children, for 
example, or people with asthma, emphysema, or other conditions rendering them 
particularly vulnerable to air pollution”) (remanding the EPA 2006 primary annual PM2.5 
NAAQS because, in part, the EPA failed to explain adequately why an annual level of 15 
µg/m3 is “requisite to protect the public health” while providing “an adequate margin of 
safety” from morbidity affecting vulnerable subpopulations)). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)(A). 
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Congress meant to limit the Agency’s consideration of cumulative 
effects to other air pollutants only. This argument might reflect 
application of a canon of statutory construction known as expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius (“the inclusion of one is the exclusion of 
others”).101 Essentially, this canon means that where Congress 
explicitly sets or excludes factors from consideration, there should be 
no additional exclusions or factors implied.102 However, Congress 
may provide a statutory list as examples, rather than as exclusive 
elements.103 Moreover, in analyzing statutory text, courts often are 
guided by the principle of reading a statute as a whole and 
interpreting its separate parts within the broader statutory context to 
further the statutory purpose.104 
As this principle relates to the CAA, Congress intended the Act “to 
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to 
promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of 
its population.”105 The preceding statement shows protection of the 
public health as a recurring theme throughout the CAA, and may 
support an argument that the EPA can use the Act “to address the 
health impacts of air pollution on communities that are 
disproportionately affected or subject to multiple sources and types of 
pollution.”106 Further, the original CAA’s legislative history suggests 
that a primary purpose of the Act is to ensure protection for those 
whose ability to resist the harmful effects of air pollution is 
compromised.107 In a congressional report in the legislative history of 
 
101 YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 16–17 (2008) [hereinafter CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97     
-589.pdf (citing Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)). 
102 See id. 
103 See Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(interpreting a CAA statutory directive that the EPA “shall take into consideration” five 
listed factors as not precluding the consideration of additional factors); CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 101, at 17 (citing NationsBank v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995)). 
104 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 101, at 1–3 (“The various 
canons of interpretation . . . are usually subordinated to interpretations that further a clearly 
expressed congressional purpose.”). 
105 Clean Air Act § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). 
106 ELI, OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 96, at 
106. 
107 H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1941–43 (1967). 
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the 1990 CAA amendments, Congress recognizes the cumulative 
health impacts of simultaneous exposure to multiple pollutants. 
We are routinely exposed to thousands of different air pollutants 
emitted every day. Exposure to this mix of pollutants can produce 
more adverse health effects than exposure to each of the individual 
pollutants. These synergistic effects must be considered if we are to 
adequately protect public health. In addition, there are many 
pathways of exposure to hazardous pollutants and contaminants. 
Exposure to polluted outdoor and indoor air, contaminated water 
and soil can combine to produce greater risks than exposure through 
only one source.108 
This statement demonstrates explicit congressional recognition that 
there can be greater adverse health risks from exposure to multiple 
pollutants and exposure pathways than there is where human health 
impacts analyses consider only pollutants individually. Faced with 
these statements of purpose, a court should support the EPA in 
broadly interpreting CAA directives as permitting the Agency to 
develop NAAQS air quality criteria based on the cumulative risks 
posed by the criteria pollutant in combination with other pollutants 
and with non-chemical stressors that may exacerbate the adverse 
health effects of the criteria pollutant. 
2. Requisite to Protect the Public Health with an Adequate Margin of 
Safety 
In deciding whether a NAAQS is “requisite to protect the public 
health,” the Supreme Court said in Whitman v. American Trucking 
Association109 that the EPA may not consider implementation costs. 
Relying on the plain meaning of the statute, the Court concluded that 
public health clearly meant “the health of the public.”110 The Court 
noted that Congress expressly stated the circumstances where it 
wished the Agency to weigh economic costs, and that to prevail in 
contesting the EPA’s action, a challenger must show a “textual 
commitment of authority to the EPA to consider costs in setting 
NAAQS” under the applicable provision.111 The Court explained that 
 
108 S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 2 (1989). 
109 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 464–71 (2001) (holding that 
CAA § 109(b) “unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting 
process”). 
110 Id. at 466. 
111 Id. at 468. 
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an agency cannot construe a statute in a way that nullifies text 
designed to limit its own discretion.112 
Read narrowly, Whitman implies that a court would limit the 
EPA’s interpretation of what factors the Agency may consider when 
setting NAAQS “requisite to protect the health.”113 That is, because 
the CAA explicitly directed the EPA to consider how air pollutants 
may interact in addressing public health impacts, air pollutant effects 
are the only cumulative ones the EPA may address when setting 
NAAQS. Therefore, in setting NAAQS, the Supreme Court might 
find it impermissible for the EPA to consider the cumulative effect on 
the public health of pollutants or stressors that have no air-related 
exposure pathways. 
On the other hand, the EPA must set primary NAAQS for each 
pollutant at levels that are “requisite to protect the public health” 
while “allowing an adequate margin of safety.”114 This statutory 
language may be broad enough to permit addressing the impacts of 
non-air pollutant and nonchemical stressors if data showed that, 
acting with the relevant criteria pollutant, such other stressors would 
contribute to endangering the public health. Courts have recognized 
the significance of this broad public health mandate. For example, in 
interpreting what it means to have “an adequate margin of safety,” 
courts have said that the EPA “has broad discretion to establish ‘an 
adequate margin of safety’ above and beyond what scientific certainty 
prescribes and to craft regulations that protect against unknown 
harms.”115 Courts have said that the Agency must “err on the side of 
caution” when establishing the margin of safety, even where the 
“medical significance [of the effects] is a matter of disagreement.”116 
 
112 Id. at 485. 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 108–11. 
114 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
115 Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Lead Indus. 
Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
116 Lead Indus. Ass’n, 647 F.2d at 1153–55; Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 
1342, 1350–53 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding NO2 primary NAAQS against industry 
challenges; holding that considering its duty to err on the side of caution, the EPA did not 
act unreasonably by comparing the benefits of the proposed NAAQS against not only the 
scenario based upon existing air quality but also upon an alternate scenario in which areas 
just meet the old NAAQS); Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 533 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (upholding the EPA’s decision to regulate coarse PM as well as fine PM; finding 
that although the EPA recognizes that the evidence of danger from coarse PM is 
“inconclusive,” the agency “need not wait for conclusive findings before regulating a 
pollutant it reasonably believes may pose a significant risk to public health,” where the  
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Another important court opinion discussing the bounds of the 
EPA’s authority to establish NAAQS under the CAA is American 
Lung Association v. EPA, in which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) explained 
that “NAAQS must protect not only average healthy individuals, but 
also ‘sensitive citizens’—children, for example, or people with 
asthma, emphysema, or other conditions rendering them particularly 
vulnerable to air pollution. If a pollutant adversely affects the health 
of those sensitive individuals, the EPA must strengthen the entire 
national standard.”117 The court cited the CAA legislative history to 
support this assertion, explaining that in efforts to reduce air 
pollution, Congress had defined public health broadly.118 Reading this 
language broadly, then, EPA arguably has authority “to protect the 
public health” by establishing NAAQS that are protective of 
populations especially vulnerable to air pollution impacts. Such a 
reading could support an assertion that the Agency may consider 
cumulative health impacts on sensitive segments of the population 
that experience adverse effects from simultaneous and prolonged 
exposure to several non-air pollutants and criteria pollutants. 
In summary, although a challenger could cite the Supreme Court’s 
Whitman decision to argue that the CAA should not permit the EPA 
to consider pollutants or stressors other than criteria air pollutants, the 
lower court decisions, the statutory mandate to protect public health 
with an adequate margin of safety, and the CAA legislative history 
support an assertion that the EPA has authority to consider the 
cumulative effects of air and non-air pollutants when setting NAAQS. 
The EPA’s exercise of authority is strongest when there is a 
specific statutory provision stating a factor or factors that the Agency 
must consider in a program decision.119 Where the Agency is relying 
on a broad public health mandate to support an exercise of discretion, 
a court could point to the general purpose statement in the CAA and 
agree that such a statement supports the EPA’s interpretation of its 
 
record supported the EPA’s cautious decision that some protection from exposure to 
coarse particles is warranted in all areas) (citing Lead Indus. Ass’n, 647 F.2d at 1155). 
117 Am. Lung Ass’n, 134 F.3d at 389. 
118 Id. at 388–89. 
119 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (explaining that courts “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress” if in the statute “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”). 
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authority to consider unstated factors if the science in the 
administrative record shows that synergistic effects120 of an air 
pollutant and a ubiquitous or pervasive non-air pollutant are 
significant and severe.121 For example, rather than following strict 
textual readings of statutes, the D.C. Circuit seems to make rational 
inferences, based on an agency’s evidence in the record, that the court 
believes do not conflict with a statute’s purpose.122 If the EPA were to 
ignore the consensus in the scientific community of severe synergistic 
health impacts of an air pollutant and a common non-air pollutant, a 
court may find that such an approach would undermine the CAA’s 
purpose of protecting the public health.123 The Agency’s 
consideration of such scientific consensus would seem to align with 
Congress’s intent, expressed in the legislative history of the 1990 
 
120 Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk 
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 119–120 (1996) (If the lifetime risk from exposure 
to one substance is added to the lifetime risk of exposure to another substance, then the 
total risk posed by exposure to the risks of each of these substances is additive. For 
example, if smoking increases the risk of contracting cancer by a factor of five, and 
exposure to asbestos increases the risk by a factor of ten, an additive effect would increase 
the lifetime risk of cancer by a factor of fifteen. If the total lifetime risk from exposure to 
each of several substances is greater than an additive function of the individual risks, then 
the lifetime risk posed by exposure to these substances is synergistic. For example, 
synergism between smoking and exposure to asbestos might result in a combined risk of 
fifty, not fifteen. An antagonistic effect results when the total risk posed by exposure to the 
risks of each of several substances is less than an additive function of the individual risks. 
Examples of antagonism are combining chemicals with toxicity levels of four and six to 
produce a mixture with a toxicity level of eight, or combining chemicals with toxicity 
levels of zero and four to produce a mixture with a toxicity level of one). 
121 See Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(finding reasonable the EPA’s consideration of unstated factors because the statute did not 
preclude additional factors, citing congressional purpose and common sense as additional 
support for why the EPA’s interpretation of its authority was reasonable) (citing George E. 
Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623–24 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding reasonable the 
EPA’s consideration of factors not stated in the statute because the statute did not preclude 
such consideration, citing stated congressional purpose as additional support) (finding 
reasonable the EPA’s consideration of unstated factors because the statute did not preclude 
additional factors, citing congressional purpose and common sense as additional support 
for why the EPA’s interpretation of its authority was reasonable)). 
122 See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 1677–79. 
123 See Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051–53 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), rev’d in part on other grounds, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that criteria 
documents, which must contain “all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which 
may be expected from” an air pollutant, must address any beneficial effects of air 
pollutants in addition to harmful effects. The court reasoned, “it seems bizarre that a 
statute intended to improve human health would . . . lock the agency into looking at only 
one half of a substances health effects in determining the maximum level for that 
substance.”). 
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CAA amendments, that because exposure to a mix of air pollutants 
can produce more adverse health effects than exposure to each 
individual pollutant, “synergistic effects must be considered if we are 
to adequately protect public health.”124 
Currently, the EPA is considering the effects of nitrous oxides 
(NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx) together when establishing NAAQS for 
those pollutants.125 However, the Agency has yet to consider the 
impacts or risks of interactions between criteria pollutants and other 
non-air pollutants when establishing NAAQS. The EPA has 
interpreted its NAAQS authority as “intended to address uncertainties 
associated with inconclusive scientific and technical information 
available at the time of standard setting. It is also intended to provide 
a reasonable degree of protection against hazards that research has not 
yet identified.”126 The EPA has explained that because of these 
uncertainties, “the Administrator is seeking not only to prevent 
pollution levels that have been demonstrated to be harmful but also to 
prevent lower pollutant levels that may pose an unacceptable risk of 
harm, even if the risk is not precisely identified as to nature or 
degree.”127 The Agency explained further that in establishing 
 
124 S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 2 (1989). 
125 See Secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Oxides of Nitrogen and 
Sulfur, 77 Fed. Reg. 20, 218 (Apr. 3, 2012); Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) and Sulfur Dioxide 
(SO2) Secondary Standards, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/no2so2sec/ 
index.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2013). The EPA has developed the secondary NAAQS 
for these pollutants together because both cause similar impacts to the environment, such 
as acidification. 77 Fed. Reg. at 20,222. The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee 
(CASAC), which is a CAA-required independent scientific review committee that must 
review the EPA’s air quality criteria and NAAQS and make recommendations, has 
approved the development of an integrated secondary standard as a “valid, scientifically 
based approach.” Letter from CASAC to Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, EPA, on Review of the 
Policy Assessment for the Review of the Secondary Nat’l Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for NOx and SOx: First Draft 1 (Apr. 29, 2010) (on file with the EPA), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/95eac6037dbee075852573a00075f732/7C35C 
4501A9E0B5385257714004DBA4D/$File/29April2010+PA+Report.pdf. 
126 Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 
35,520, 35,521 (June 22, 2010) (citing Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1154 
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 
F.2d 1176, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982)). 
127 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,521; see Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 533 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding the EPA’s decision to regulate coarse PM as well as fine PM; 
finding that although the EPA recognizes that the evidence of danger from coarse PM is 
“inconclusive,” the agency “need not wait for conclusive findings before regulating a 
pollutant it reasonably believes may pose a significant risk to public health,” where the  
ALVES (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2014  1:37 PM 
180 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 28, 151 
standards with an adequate margin of safety, it “considers such 
factors as the nature and severity of the health effects involved, the 
size of the at-risk population(s) and the kind and degree of 
uncertainties that must be addressed.”128 
Courts have supported the Agency’s interpretation. For example, in 
American Trucking Associations v. EPA,129 the D.C. Circuit upheld 
the PM2.5 and ozone NAAQS against a challenge that the EPA failed 
to describe the standard applied in determining the appropriate level 
for the NAAQS. The Agency stated that it need not determine a “safe 
level” of PM2.5 before calculating a margin of safety.130 In upholding 
the NAAQS and supporting the EPA’s claim that there is no threshold 
amount of scientific information or degree of certainty required to 
promulgate or revise a NAAQS, the court explained that although 
“the [CAA] . . . require[s] EPA [to] qualitatively . . . describe the 
standard governing its selection of particular NAAQS,” the Agency 
need not “establish a measure of the risk to safety it considers 
adequate to protect public health every time it establishes a 
NAAQS.”131 The court held that the CAA “requires EPA to 
promulgate protective primary NAAQS even where . . . the 
pollutant’s risks cannot be quantified or precisely identified as to 
nature or degree.”132 Regarding secondary NAAQS, the court 
explained that because “the [CAA] mandates promulgation of 
secondary standards requisite to protect the public welfare from any 
 
record supported the EPA’s cautious decision that some protection from exposure to 
coarse particles is warranted in all areas). 
128 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,521. See also EPA, REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR 
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER: POLICY ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC 
AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION: OAQPS STAFF PAPER II-2 (1996), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/data/1996pmstaffpaper.pdf. 
129 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding PM2.5 
and ozone NAAQS upon remand from the Supreme Court). 
130 Id. at 368–71. 
131 Id. at 369 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 973 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990), vacated in part, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (vacating a later part of the 
court’s decision)); see Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’n Clean Air Project v. EPA, 686 F.3d 803, 
812–13 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding SO2 primary NAAQS against industry challenges that 
the EPA acted arbitrarily in setting the level of SO2 emissions where the EPA concluded 
that it was reasonable to presume that people with more severe asthma would suffer more 
serious health consequences from short-term exposures to SO2 even though the EPA did 
not rely on specific studies that showed this association; holding that the “EPA has 
discretion to set a NAAQS at a concentration level below a level that has been 
demonstrated to have a statistically significant association with negative health effects”) 
(citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 283 F.3d at 371). 
132 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 283 F.3d at 369 (citations omitted). 
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‘anticipated adverse effects associated with’ regulated pollutants . . . 
EPA must act as soon as it has enough information (even if crude) to 
‘anticipate’ such effects.”133 
The EPA’s current interpretation of its NAAQS authority leaves 
room for the Agency to consider the cumulative effects of air and 
non-air pollutants if the Agency finds that the risks of these impacts 
adversely affect the public health, and that more stringent NAAQS 
would contribute to protecting the public health from these 
cumulative effects. Similarly, if the EPA had strong scientific 
evidence that a non-chemical stressor—for example, poor nutrition—
significantly affected a population’s vulnerability to a criteria 
pollutant, the EPA’s current interpretation of its NAAQS authority 
seems to allow room for the Agency to consider such evidence in 
deciding the level of NAAQS that will protect the public health while 
allowing an adequate margin of safety. Federal agencies may—and 
arguably should—change their standard-setting methodology where 
new scientific evidence indicates a different approach would better 
serve a statutory mandate.134 If there is current scientific evidence to 
support a different determination of what constitutes “requisite to 
protect the public health,” and the Agency rationally presents the 
evidence in the rulemaking process, the EPA could change the 
methodology by which it establishes NAAQS.135 
In assessing whether there is sufficient scientific evidence for the 
EPA to claim that it is reasonable to use that evidence in setting 
NAAQS, a court would review the Agency’s action under the APA 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.136 For example, a 
 
133 Id. at 380. 
134 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 
(1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, 
the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and 
the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”). 
135 See Coal. of Battery Recyclers Ass’n v. EPA, 604 F.3d 613, 618–19 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (upholding the EPA’s shift in focus, from blood levels in the original 1978 NAAQS 
to IQ decrements in children in the revised NAAQS, where the EPA explained in both the 
proposed and final rule that current scientific evidence no longer recognized a safe blood 
level, and that epidemiological studies of cognitive effects and lead exposure commonly 
use IQ scores and that the scientific literature supports the conclusion that lead exposure 
causes IQ loss in children). 
136 Under the CAA, courts will set aside the EPA’s determination only if it is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(d)(9)(A); see also Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’n Clean Air Project, 686 F.3d at 809–10  
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challenger opposing the EPA’s consideration of a cumulative risk 
assessment might argue that the methodologies involve too many 
complex unknowns and uncertainties for the Agency to draw 
reasonable conclusions from the results. Recall from the Section 3.2 
discussion that courts often will probe deeply into the science and 
reason underlying an agency’s decision when a challenger asserts that 
the agency’s choice of methodologies or studies was unreasonable or 
that the agency failed to consider a plausible alternative.137 The main 
lesson from these types of court challenges is that agencies must 
consider all relevant evidence before making a decision, and must 
base those choices in reason.138 Further, where reasonable minds 
could differ regarding conclusions taken from a set of evidence, 
courts generally will defer to agencies’ expertise, particularly where 
the evidence and choices are in complex subject matter areas in which 
the agency specializes.139 
 
(citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (arbitrary and capricious 
standard under the CAA is interpreted in “essentially the same” way as the same standard 
under the APA)). 
137 See Hapner v. Tidwell, 621 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although the ultimate 
scope of our review may be narrow, the depth must be sufficient for us to be able to 
comprehend the agency’s handling of the evidence cited or relied upon.”) (citing Nw. 
Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides v. EPA, 544 F.3d 1043, 1052 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008)); Am. Farm 
Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“An agency’s failure 
adequately to consider a relevant and significant aspect of a problem may render its 
rulemaking arbitrary and capricious. [The] ‘agency must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.’”) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); Leather Indus. of Am. v. EPA, 40 
F.3d 392, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (examining the EPA’s risk assessment, and finding the 
Agency’s choice of conservative exposure pathway on which to base the standard 
insufficiently supported); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1230 (5th Cir. 
1991) (invalidating asbestos rule under the Toxic Substances Control Act holding that the 
EPA presented insufficient evidence to justify its asbestos ban on two grounds: the failure 
of the Agency to consider all necessary evidence and its failure to calculate risk levels for 
intermediate levels of regulation); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 921 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (agency must provide a full analytic defense when its model is 
challenged). 
138 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (holding that a court must vacate an agency action if “the agency has relied on 
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise”). 
139 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(en banc); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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In Coalition of Battery Recyclers Association v. EPA,140 the D.C. 
Circuit shed light on what courts will consider sufficient scientific 
certainty and evidence to survive a challenge that the EPA’s choice of 
NAAQS form and level141 was arbitrary. In that 2010 case, the D.C. 
Circuit upheld the EPA’s shift in focus from blood lead levels in the 
original 1978 lead NAAQS to IQ decrements in children resulting 
from lead exposure in the revised lead NAAQS.142 The petitioners 
challenging the EPA’s decision contended that using IQ decrements 
to revise the lead NAAQS was arbitrary and capricious for three 
reasons. Petitioners asserted first that IQ measurements are more 
uncertain than blood lead level measurements, second that 
confounding factors such as environmental factors affect IQ scores, 
and third that the population significance of IQ loss is imprecise.143 
However, the court noted that in the rulemaking record, the “EPA 
explained that a large number of high quality studies support[ed] the 
inference that lead exposure causes population IQ loss, and that 
animal studies in which confounding factors are not present show that 
low levels of lead cause neurobehavioral effects.”144 The challengers 
further claimed that the EPA acknowledged the standard error of 
measurement for IQ as between three and four IQ points, and that an 
 
140 Coal. of Battery Recyclers Ass’n v. EPA, 604 F.3d 613 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
141 Each NAAQS has four components: the indicator, the level, the averaging time, and 
the form. The “indicator” defines the parameters of the substance that the EPA will 
measure—for example, the size or composition of the particles to which a PM standard 
will apply. The “level” specifies the acceptable concentration of that indicator in the air. 
The “averaging time” specifies the span of time across which the amount of a pollutant in 
the air will be averaged. For example, some NAAQS require a certain average annual 
level, while others require a certain average daily level. The “form” of a NAAQS 
describes how compliance with the level will be determined within this averaging time. A 
NAAQS with a daily averaging time, for example, might require that the level not be 
exceeded on more than one day each year. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 559 F.3d at 516 
(remanding 2006 NAAQS for fine PM to EPA; upholding 2006 NAAQS for coarse PM); 
see EPA, POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE CARBON MONOXIDE NATIONAL 
AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS 1-1 (2010), available at http://epa.gov/ttn/naaqs 
/standards/co/data/20101022copafinal.pdf. 
142 See Coal. of Battery Recyclers Ass’n, 604 F.3d at 618–19 (upholding the EPA’s 
shift in focus, from blood levels in the original 1978 NAAQS to IQ decrements in children 
in the revised NAAQS, where the EPA explained in both the proposed and final rule that 
current scientific evidence no longer recognized a safe blood level, that epidemiological 
studies of cognitive effects and lead exposure commonly use IQ scores, and that the 
scientific literature supports the conclusion that lead exposure causes IQ loss in children). 
143 Id. at 618. 
144 Id. 
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IQ decrement of two points was undetectable in a given individual. In 
rejecting this argument, the court agreed with the EPA that such an 
assertion confused the “‘critical distinction between population and 
individual risk,’ wherein a small change in IQ at the level of an 
individual is a substantial change at the level of a population.”145 The 
Coalition of Battery Recyclers Association case is one example of the 
D.C. Circuit applying considerable deference to the EPA decisions in 
the scientific context. 
In a 2009 decision, American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA,146 
the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenger’s objection to the EPA’s 
methodology for setting primary annual PM2.5 NAAQS where the 
EPA declined to rely on a quantitative risk assessment prepared for 
the rulemaking.147 The petitioners argued that the EPA should have 
relied on the risk assessment to set the PM2.5 NAAQS because it 
would result in a standard more protective than the one chosen.148 In 
rejecting the petitioners’ argument, the court accepted as sufficiently 
reasonable the EPA’s explanation that in leaving unresolved the 
question of whether there was a threshold below which PM2.5 is 
harmless, “the risk assessment . . . [predicted] that ever lower 
standards result in ever lower risks, which is not supported by 
statistically significant epidemiological evidence.”149 The petitioners 
also objected to the EPA’s non-reliance on the risk assessment results 
as arbitrary and capricious because the Agency had relied upon a risk 
assessment when last setting the NAAQS for PM in 1997.150 The 
court explained that it “must defer to the EPA’s assessment of 
scientific data within its technical expertise as long as the agency has 
examined the data and adequately explained itself.”151 
These decisions lend support to the assertion that in revising 
NAAQSs, the EPA should explore fully the current state of science 
 
145 Id. at 618–19 (internal citations omitted). 
146 Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
147 Id. at 527–28. 
148 Id. at 527. 
149 Id. at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. (citing City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (finding sufficient the EPA’s justification for its decisions to place little faith in 
the quantitative results of a risk assessment prepared for the NAAQS rulemaking because 
the court “owe[d] deference to an agency’s determination regarding the reliability of 
scientific evidence” and the petitioners gave “no reason to question EPA’s judgment 
regarding the reliability of the risk assessment”). 
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surrounding a potential revision, and that a court will uphold a 
challenge to the Agency’s change in the methodology for setting a 
NAAQS if the rulemaking record adequately explains the reason for 
the change, and the changed methodology protects the public 
health.152 Courts generally will grant federal agencies deference “to 
review the scientific evidence and draw inferences from it as long as 
they have appropriate ‘sufficient’ evidence for their inferences.”153 
Therefore, even with the uncertainty inherent in cumulative risk 
assessments, a court may uphold the EPA’s decision if the Agency 
provides a reasonable explanation based on all relevant scientific 
evidence and the EPA expertise.154 
C. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(NESHAPs) 
Through the NESHAP program, the EPA regulates hazardous air 
pollutants (“HAPs,” toxic air pollutants, or air toxics). HAPs are those 
pollutants that cause or may cause cancer or other serious health 
effects, such as reproductive effects or birth defects, or adverse 
environmental and ecological effects.155 Most HAPs originate from 
human-made sources, including mobile sources (e.g., cars, trucks, 
buses), stationary sources (e.g., factories, refineries, power plants), 
and indoor sources (e.g., building materials and activities such as 
 
152 See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (“Sudden and 
unexplained change . . . may be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. But if [this 
pitfall is] avoided, change is not invalidating.”) (citations omitted); Coal. of Battery 
Recyclers Ass’n, 604 F.3d at 618–19 (upholding the EPA’s change in methodology 
because the Agency sufficiently explained its rationale); Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 559 
F.3d 512, 521 (“An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change, either with 
or without a change in circumstances.”). 
153 AM. BAR ASS’N, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND 
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra note 1, at 378. 
154 See Coal. of Battery Recyclers Ass’n, 604 F.3d at 618–19 (upholding the EPA’s 
methodology against challenges of uncertainty and imprecision because the Agency 
explained that a large number of high quality studies supported its view to protect the 
population as a whole, even though precise individual effects were difficult to measure); 
Miami-Dade Cnty. v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1063 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that in the 
context of environmental litigation and otherwise, a determination of endangerment to 
public health is necessarily a question of policy that must be supported by an assessment 
of risks, and that should not be bound by either the procedural or the substantive rigor 
proper for questions of fact) (citations omitted). 
155 EPA, supra note 78. 
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cleaning).156 The CAA requires the EPA to control 187 HAPs,157 and 
to review the list of 187 HAPs, and add any pollutants to the list upon 
a finding that they “present, or may present, through inhalation or 
other routes of exposure, a threat of adverse human health effects . . . 
or adverse environmental effects.”158 
The CAA requires the EPA to list categories and subcategories of 
“major sources” and “area sources” of certain HAPs.159 For the 
categories and subcategories that the EPA lists, the Agency must 
establish initial, technology-based emissions standards (National 
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, or NESHAPs).160 
If the initial NESHAPs do not provide an ample margin of safety to 
protect the public health, the CAA then requires the EPA to set 
residual risk standards to reduce any remaining risk from sources 
regulated under the program.161 The Agency must promulgate residual 
risk standards for a source category or subcategory if necessary to 
provide an ample margin of safety to protect the public health or to 
prevent an adverse environmental effect.162 
In the NESHAP program, major sources are those sources that 
emit, or have the potential to emit, any single HAP at a rate of ten 
tons per year or more, or 25 tons per year of any combination of 
HAPs.163 For a “major source,” the EPA may establish a cutoff 
emissions quantity of less than 10 or 25 tons per year “on the basis of 
the potency of the air pollutant, persistence, potential for 
bioaccumulation, other characteristics of the air pollutant, or other 
relevant factors.”164 A statement in the Senate Report for the 1990 
CAA amendments explained the purpose of this provision as follows: 
The Administrator may establish quantities less than 10 tons per 
year for one pollutant or 25 tons per year for any combination, if the 
toxicity (potency) of the pollutant or pollutants or other 
noneconomic factors (human exposure, concentration of sources 
additive or synergistic effects, environmental damage or other 
factors) indicates that a lower threshold is appropriate. The 
authority to set lower thresholds as part of the “major” definition 
 
156 Id. 
157 Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). 
158 Id. § 7412(b)(2). 
159 Id. § 7412(c)(1). 
160 Id. § 7412(d). 
161 Id. § 7412(f). 
162 Id. § 7412(f)(2). 
163 Id. § 7412(a)(1). 
164 Id. 
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may be especially useful in the control of particulate emissions 
including metals for some source categories.165 
Congress’s expressed intent indicates that standards set for major 
sources may address “additive or synergistic effects.” This legislative 
history may support an assertion that in creating the HAPs regulatory 
structure, Congress expected the Agency to assess the cumulative 
risks of HAPs with other environmental pollutants. Further, in 
requiring the EPA to list each category or subcategory of area sources 
that the Agency finds “presents a threat of adverse effects to human 
health or the environment (by such sources individually or in the 
aggregate) warranting regulation,”166 the CAA directs the EPA to take 
account of the cumulative effects of all HAPs emitters, large and 
small, when identifying and listing area sources of HAPs. 
1. Initial NESHAPs 
After listing the HAPs source categories, the EPA must establish 
NESHAPs for these categories,167 which require sources to meet a 
“maximum available control technology” (MACT) standard based on 
each source category’s underlying industrial process.168 “The MACT 
standards for existing sources must be at least as stringent as the 
average emissions limitation achieved by the best performing 12 
percent of existing sources (for which the Administrator has 
emissions information) or the best performing [five] sources for 
source categories with less than [thirty] sources.”169 This level of 
minimum stringency is called the “MACT floor.”170 For new sources, 
MACT standards must be at least as stringent as the control level 
 
165 S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 151(1989) (emphasis added). 
166 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3). 
167 Id. § 7412(c)(2). 
168 Id. § 7412(d)(1)–(2). 
169 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: 
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 75 Fed. Reg. 
32,006, 32,008 (proposed June 4, 2010); Clean Air Act § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3). 
170 The MACT floor is the minimum control level allowed for MACT standards 
promulgated under the CAA, and may not be based on cost considerations. See National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions: Hard and Decorative 
Chromium Electroplating and Chromium Anodizing Tanks; Group I Polymers and Resins; 
Marine Tank Vessel Loading Operations; Pharmaceuticals Production; The Printing and 
Publishing Industry; and Steel Pickling—HCl Process Facilities and Hydrochloric Acid 
Regeneration Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,068, 65,071 (2010). 
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achieved in practice by the best-controlled similar source.171 In 
developing a NESHAP MACT standard, the EPA also must consider 
control options that are more stringent than the MACT floor,172 and 
“shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the 
[HAPs]” that EPA determines is achievable “taking into consideration 
the cost of achieving [the] emissions reduction, and any non-air 
quality health and environmental impacts[,] and energy 
requirements.”173 
The directive for the Agency to consider non-air quality health and 
environmental impacts may constitute broad authority to include a 
wide range of these impacts in setting NESHAPs.174 Indeed, the D.C. 
Circuit determined in a 2000 decision that the EPA did not comply 
with the CAA in setting MACT standards without showing in the 
administrative record whether the Agency had considered “non-air- 
quality health and environmental impacts.”175 A 2004 decision of this 
same court, Sierra Club v. EPA, let stand the EPA’s interpretation of 
the CAA directive to consider “non-air quality health and 
environmental impacts,” a concept not defined in the statute, as 
permitting analysis of any non-air impacts that may result from the 
required efforts to control the air quality impacts of an underlying 
manufacturing process.176 Under Chevron, where Congress does not 
define a term used in a statute, a court “will defer to [an agency’s] 
construction of the ambiguous statutory language, so long as it is 
reasonable.”177 In the Sierra Club case, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that 
the EPA’s interpretation was reasonable, because “non-air quality . . . 
impacts” are grouped with cost and energy requirements in the CAA 
provision stating what the EPA must consider in establishing the 
MACT, and this “context strongly supports [the] EPA’s interpretation 
of ‘non-air quality . . . impacts’ to mean the byproducts of the control 
 
171 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (emphasis added). 
174 See ELI, OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 
96, at 111. 
175 See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 634–35 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
176 See Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the EPA’s 
refusal to set “beyond-the-MACT-floor” standards where the Agency explained that the 
control method at issue was not predictable and consistent). 
177 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984)). 
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technology—just as additional cost or energy needs are byproducts of 
controlling air quality impacts.”178 
Although the petitioner asserted that in setting the MACT standard, 
the statute required the EPA to consider the impacts of deposition, 
persistence, toxicity and bioaccumulation of HAP emissions on 
people, wildlife, and the environment. The court found that following 
the petitioner’s interpretation would discredit Congress’s division of 
the NESHAPs structure into an initial technology-based 
determination, followed by a risk-based determination.179 The Sierra 
Club court held that the CAA did not require the EPA to consider 
cumulative health risks in establishing the MACT. However, 
following the case reasoning, the EPA could reasonably interpret non-
air quality impacts as allowing it to consider cumulative effects, 
because cumulative risks fit within the term “non-air quality health 
and environmental impacts,” and especially because the EPA is 
currently collapsing technology (i.e., MACT standard) review with 
residual risk standard setting.180 
In another CAA provision that addresses the EPA’s authority to set 
initial NESHAPs, the statute states that, for “pollutants for which a 
health threshold181 has been established, the Administrator may 
consider such threshold level, with an ample margin of safety, when 
 
178 Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 990. 
179 Id. 
180 The Risk and Technology Review (RTR) is a combined effort to evaluate both risk 
and technology as required by the CAA after the application of MACT standards. The 
CAA directs the EPA to conduct risk assessments on each source category subject to 
MACT standards, and to determine if additional standards are needed to reduce residual 
risks. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2). Further, the CAA requires the EPA to review and revise the 
MACT standards, as necessary, taking into account developments in practices, processes 
and control technologies. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2). The RTR review combines these two 
required efforts. See Risk and Technology Review, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/rrisk/ 
rtrpg.html (last updated May 31, 2013). 
181 A health threshold for a pollutant is a threshold below which no observable effects 
occur. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: 
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 75 Fed. Reg. 
32,006, 32,030 (proposed June 4, 2010) (citing S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 171–72 (1989)); 
Human Health Toxicity Assessment, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/region8/human-health       
-toxicity-assessment (last updated April 22, 2013). (For non-cancer effects, “[t]he 
threshold dose is typically estimated from toxicological data (derived from studies of 
humans and/or animals) by determining the highest dose that does not produce an 
observable adverse effect and the lowest does which does product an effect.” For cancer 
effects, it is typically assumed that there is no health threshold, i.e., “there is no dose other 
than zero that does not increase the risk of cancer.”). 
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establishing [NESHAPs].”182 In a 2010–2011 rulemaking on setting 
initial NESHAPs for boiler sources, the EPA explained that this 
provision “is intended to allow [the] EPA to establish emission 
standards other than conventional MACT standards, in cases where a 
less stringent emission standard will still ensure that the health 
threshold will not be exceeded, with an ample margin of safety.”183 In 
this rulemaking, the EPA interpreted the health threshold provision to 
allow it “to weigh additional factors, beyond any established health 
threshold, in making a judgment whether to set a standard for a 
specific pollutant based on the threshold, or instead follow the 
traditional path of developing a MACT standard after determining a 
MACT floor.”184 The EPA gave a representative list of such 
additional factors, including the following:185 
 The potential for cumulative adverse health effects because of 
concurrent exposure to other HAPs with similar biological 
endpoints, from either the same or other source categories, 
where the concentration of the threshold pollutant emitted from 
the given source category is below the threshold. 
 The potential impacts on ecosystems of releases of the pollutant. 
 Reductions in criteria pollutant emissions and other co-benefits 
that would be achieved via the MACT standard. 
In justifying its interpretation, the Agency explained that, “[e]ach 
of these factors is directly relevant to the health and environmental 
outcomes at which [the NESHAP provisions] of the [CAA are] 
fundamentally aimed.”186 In this boiler MACT rulemaking, the EPA 
concluded that it lacked the information to calculate a sufficiently 
protective health-based emissions standard, because the Agency 
lacked information to assess the toxicity of the relevant HAP (in this 
case, hydrogen chloride [HCl], as a surrogate for acid gas HAPs) with 
other respiratory irritants, and to meaningfully evaluate other air 
pollutant sources near boilers emitting hydrogen chloride.187 In this 
 
182 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(4). 
183 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: 
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
32,030. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: 
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 76 Fed. Reg. 
15,608, 15,642–44 (Mar. 21, 2011); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air  
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rulemaking, the EPA asserted authority to consider cumulative risks 
from other pollutants affecting the same health endpoint (i.e., 
respiratory irritants) under a NESHAP provision that did not mention 
cumulative risks. Using the same rationale, i.e., by referencing the 
underlying purposes of the statutory provisions at issue, the EPA 
could similarly interpret other broad CAA authorities. 
2. Residual Risk NESHAPs 
In the second stage of HAPs regulation, the EPA must review any 
residual health risks that have not been eliminated by the initial 
technology-based standards.188 The EPA must promulgate residual 
risk NESHAPs “if promulgation of such standards is required in order 
to provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health . . . or to 
prevent, taking into consideration costs, energy, safety, and other 
relevant factors, an adverse environmental effect.”189 
In its current residual risk determinations, the EPA considers 
cumulative effects, at least in a narrow sense. The EPA has explained 
in recent residual risk rulemakings that the 1990 CAA Amendments 
authorized the Agency’s use of a two-step process for developing 
standards to address residual risk, and preserved its interpretation of 
“ample margin of safety” developed in the 1989 Benzene 
NESHAP.190 
 
Pollutants for Major Sources: Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and 
Process Heaters, 75 Fed. Reg. at 32,030–32. 
188 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f); see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 
Stat. 2399 (Nov. 15, 1990). 
189 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A). “Adverse environmental effect” is defined as “any 
significant and widespread adverse effect, which may reasonably be anticipated, to 
wildlife, aquatic life or natural resources, including adverse impacts on populations of 
endangered or threatened species or significant degradation of environmental qualities 
over broad areas.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(7). 
190 E.g., NESHAP for Secondary Aluminum Production, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,576, 8,578 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2012); see NESHAP for Benzene Emissions, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 
(Sept. 14, 1989) (codified at 40 CFR pt. 61). The EPA asserts that CAA Section 
112(f)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(B), preserves the interpretation set out in the Benzene 
NESHAP, and that the D.C. Circuit concluded that the EPA’s interpretation of Section 
112(f)(2)(B) is a reasonable one. NESHAP for Secondary Aluminum Production, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 8,578–79; see Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (stating that “subsection 112(f)(2)(B) expressly incorporates the EPA’s 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act from the Benzene standard, complete with a citation to 
the Federal Register”). 
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The first step in this process is the determination of acceptable risk. 
“The second step provides for an ample margin of safety to protect 
public health, which is the level at which the standards are set (unless 
a more stringent standard is required to prevent, taking into 
consideration costs, energy, safety, and other relevant factors, an 
adverse environmental effect).”191 
The EPA has explained that it does not define rigid lines of 
acceptability, but weighs rather broad objectives by applying a series 
of other health measures and factors.192 For example, in setting a 
cancer risk presumption for the 1989 Benzene NESHAP, the EPA 
explained: 
[R]ather than a rigid line for acceptability, the Agency intends to 
weigh it with a series of other health measures and factors. These 
include the overall incidence of cancer or other serious health 
effects within the exposed population, the numbers of persons 
exposed within each individual lifetime risk range and associated 
incidence within, typically a 50 [kilometer] exposure radius around 
facilities, the science policy assumptions and estimation 
uncertainties associated with the risk measures, weight of the 
scientific evidence for human health effects, other quantified or 
unquantified health effects, effects due to co-location of facilities, 
and co-emission of pollutants.193 
In this statement, the EPA apparently recognizes Agency discretion 
to consider cumulative effects when assessing the need for residual 
risk amendments to the NESHAPs. The EPA has noted in recent 
residual risk rulemakings that these health measures and factors taken 
together may provide a more realistic description of the magnitude of 
 
191 NESHAP for Secondary Aluminum Production, 77 Fed. Reg. at 8,578; NESHAP 
for Hard and Decorative Chromium Electroplating and Chromium Anodizing Tanks and 
Related Sources, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,068, 65,071–72 (proposed Oct. 21, 2010). The EPA 
explained in the Benzene NESHAP that an overall objective in protecting the public health 
with an adequate margin of safety was to provide maximum feasible protection against 
risks to health from HAPs by (1) protecting the greatest number of persons possible to an 
individual lifetime risk level no higher than approximately 1-in-1 million (1 x 10-6); and 
(2) limiting to no higher than approximately 1-in-10,000 (1 x 10-4) (i.e., 100-in-1 million) 
the estimated risk that a person living near a facility would have if he or she was exposed 
to the maximum pollutant concentrations for seventy years. See NESHAP for Benzene 
Emissions, 54 Fed. Reg. at 38,044–45. 
192 NESHAP for Secondary Aluminum Production, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,576, 8,579; 
NESHAP: Hard and Decorative Chromium Electroplating and Chromium Anodizing 
Tanks and Related Sources, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,068, 65,072; EPA, RESIDUAL RISK REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ES-11 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/caaa/t3/reports/ 
risk_rep.pdf. 
193 NESHAP for Benzene Emissions, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,045 (emphasis added). 
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risk in the exposed population than that provided by maximum 
individual lifetime cancer risk alone.194 The EPA asserts that in the 
2008 case Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (NRDC), the 
D.C. Circuit approved this approach to establishing health-based 
residual risk standards as reasonable when the court stated that the 
statutory approach to establishing residual risk standards “expressly 
incorporates [the] EPA’s interpretation of the [CAA] from the 
Benzene standard.”195 
Unlike the NAAQS and MACT standard setting authorities, the 
residual risk standard setting directives of the CAA do specifically 
mention risk. For HAPs that are known, probable, or possible human 
carcinogens, if the initial NESHAP standard does not, “reduce 
lifetime excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to 
emissions from a source in the category or subcategory to less than 1-
in-1 million,” the EPA must promulgate residual risk standards for the 
source category as necessary, “to provide an ample margin of safety 
to protect public health.”196 “A risk level of 1-in-1 million implies a 
likelihood that up to one person, out of one million equally exposed 
people, would contract cancer if exposed continuously (24 hours per 
day) to the specific concentration over seventy years (an assumed 
lifetime).”197 This would be in addition to those cancer cases that 
would normally occur in an unexposed population of one million 
people.198 
Note that the statutory directive to promulgate residual risk 
standards for carcinogens obligates the Agency to establish standards 
that provide an adequate margin of safety, but does not require that 
the EPA establish standards such that the lifetime cancer risk is 
 
194 See, e.g., NESHAP for Secondary Aluminum Production, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,576, 
8,579; NESHAP: Hard and Decorative Chromium Electroplating and Chromium 
Anodizing Tanks and Related Sources, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,068, 65,072. 
195 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
196 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A). 
197 Glossary of Key Terms, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/natamain/gloss1.html 
(last updated Feb. 11, 2011); see also Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., Risk Assessment, 
IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/idem/4144.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (“The risk 
associated with the potential to develop cancer after exposure to [a pollutant] is often 
expressed as a probability or a fraction in a range from zero to one (0.0–1.0). A zero 
chance would mean there is no chance of developing cancer and a one chance would mean 
there is absolute certainty that one will develop cancer. Usually the numbers are very small 
and shown in fractions of one million or fractions of one hundred thousand.” 
198 EPA, supra note 197. 
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reduced to below 1-in-1 million; rather, 1-in-1 million is the risk 
benchmark at which the EPA must promulgate health-based standards 
for carcinogenic HAPs. As the D.C. Circuit observed in NRDC, the 
statute “says nothing about the substantive content of [the residual 
risk] standards.”199 In NDRC, the court rejected the petitioner’s 
argument that the EPA must set the residual risk standard for 
carcinogenic HAPs to reduce the risk below 1-in-1 million.200 The 
EPA declined to set residual risk standards for the HAP at issue 
because the Agency determined that “no individual would face an 
excess lifetime cancer risk of greater than 100-in-one million, which 
[the] EPA regard[ed] as the ‘presumptively acceptable’ [risk] level 
under its precedents.”201 Because the risk of 1-in-1 million is the 
procedural trigger for when the EPA must set residual risk standards, 
and not an expression of the risk those standards must protect against, 
the court found that the “EPA’s interpretation of [the CAA residual 
risk standard provision], although not an inevitable one, certainly is, 
at least, a reasonable construction of the statute.”202 This decision 
indicates that the EPA likely has wide latitude to reasonably interpret 
what level of residual risk standards are necessary, “to provide an 
ample margin of safety to protect the public health,”203 and that courts 
will view such Agency determination with a great degree of deference 
as falling within the Agency’s technical expertise.204 
Were the EPA to add the cumulative effects of background 
pollutants to a residual risk assessment, such an analytical method 
would be different from what the Agency does now for residual risk 
HAPs determinations. However, the EPA’s stated approach to 
determining required emissions levels for providing “an ample margin 
of safety to protect public health”205 appears to leave room for the 
Agency to consider a broad range of cumulative effects, including the 
cumulative risks posed by non-chemical stressors. Factors such as 
poverty and lack of health care could impact a population’s sensitivity 
 
199 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1081–83 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
200 Id. at 1081. 
201 Id. at 1080. 
202 Id. at 1083. 
203 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A). 
204 See City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that 
courts “will give an extreme degree of deference to the agency when it ‘is evaluating 
scientific data within its technical expertise’”) (quoting Huls Am., Inc. v. Browner, 83 
F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
205 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A). 
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to a HAP source, especially if there are many sources located near a 
population impacted by such non-chemical stressors. As discussed 
above, Federal agencies can change their standard-setting 
methodology if the current scientific evidence supports the revised 
methodology and the agency explains its new reasoning in the 
rulemaking process.206 Therefore, if the EPA can demonstrate that 
reliable scientific evidence shows substantial cumulative health risks 
of a particular HAP, when combined with other relevant stressors 
near major sources (either chemical or non-chemical), it appears 
likely that a court would uphold a residual risk decision that 
considered such cumulative risks. 
D. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permits 
The CAA establishes several permit programs to control the 
amount and type of air emissions from certain sources. The statute 
requires states and the EPA to designate geographic areas (e.g., 
counties or metropolitan statistical areas) as “attainment” or 
“nonattainment” based on whether the air quality in that area meets 
the NAAQS for a given criteria pollutant.207 In an attainment area, 
before construction of a major new source or modification of an 
existing source that will emit the pollutant for which the area is in 
attainment, a permitting authority must conduct preconstruction 
review and approve the construction or modification.208 The program 
for review and approval is the PSD (prevention of significant 
deterioration) permitting program. 
Under the CAA, each state must develop a SIP that outlines how 
the state will control air pollution under the Act,209 including how the 
 
206 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 
(1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, 
the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and 
the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”); see also Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 900 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “federal 
agencies have the power to adjust policies and rulings in light of experience”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
207 See Clean Air Act § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
208 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479(2)(c), 7411(a)(4) (“Preconstruction requirements”), 
7479(2)(C) (defining construction to include the modification of any source or facility), 
7411(a)(4) (defining modification). 
209 Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. (A state implement plan (SIP) is a collection 
of the regulations, programs, and policies that a state will use to meet the EPA standards  
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state will implement the PSD program.210 The EPA must approve 
state SIPs and serves as the permitting authority for states without an 
approved SIP or states improperly implementing the program.211 
Although there are other CAA permit programs, this analysis 
addresses PSD permits, which frequently are the subject of challenges 
and of administrative review decisions that address CAA authority to 
review and issue PSD permits. 
The PSD permit program requires an owner or operator to obtain a 
permit for a new or modified major source with the potential to emit a 
criteria pollutant in an attainment area for that pollutant and, 
consequently, contribute to concentrations of the pollutant in the 
area.212 In attainment or PSD areas, a source must apply Best 
Available Control Technology (BACT).213 The CAA requires that the 
permitting authority take into account energy, environmental, and 
economic impacts and other costs in weighing BACT options.214 
To obtain a PSD permit, an applicant must show that emissions 
from the source would “not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in 
excess of any [emissions limitation for each pollutant subject to PSD 
regulation], [NAAQS], or any other applicable emission standard of 
performance under this chapter,”215 by demonstrating that emissions 
will not cause or contribute to air pollution that exceeds an area’s 
 
and clean up polluted areas. Understanding the Clean Air Act, EPA, http://www.epa. 
gov/air/peg/understand.html (last update Mar. 6, 2012). 
210 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C). 
211 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (directing the EPA to create a Federal Implementation 
Plan (FIP) for a State if a State fails to submit a SIP or to revise a SIP as required by the 
EPA). 
212 42 U.S.C. § 7475; 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(b); see also Pacific Southwest, Region 9, Air 
Permits, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/permit/psd-public-part.html (last updated 
Aug. 6, 2013). 
213 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). 
214 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining best available control technology as “an emission 
limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to 
regulation under this chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting 
facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is available for 
such a facility through application of production processes and achievable methods, 
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative 
fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant. In no event shall application 
of ‘best available control technology’ result in emissions of any pollutants which will 
exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable [NAAQS or NESHAP].”); 40 C.F.R. § 
51.165(a)(xl) (requiring state plans to have a specific definition for BACT, which 
incorporates the statutory definition). 
215 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d). 
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maximum allowable increase over baseline concentration (ambient air 
increment, or PSD increment).216 The baseline concentration is 
defined for each pollutant and, in general, is the ambient 
concentration existing at the time that the first complete PSD permit 
application affecting an area is submitted.217 “Significant 
deterioration” occurs at the point where the amount of criteria 
pollution from the proposed source would exceed the applicable PSD 
increment.218 PSD increments prevent the air quality in attainment 
areas from deteriorating to or below the level set by the NAAQS. The 
Environmental Appeals Board (EAB or Board), an EPA 
administrative tribunal that adjudicates appeals of permit decisions 
made by states and local districts with delegated Federal authority, is 
the primary adjudicator of challenges to decisions of PSD permitting 
authorities.219 
On several occasions, the EAB has addressed environmental justice 
issues in connection with PSD permit appeals.220 Environmental 
justice issues usually arise in the context of claims that the permitting 
authority failed to consider the combined impact of constructing or 
modifying a source and the cumulative effects of other pollution 
sources on minority or low-income communities near the relevant 
permit area. In the context of a PSD permit review, a cumulative 
effects analysis and an environmental justice analysis are analogous 
in that each could reasonably be part of the initial permit review and 
approval process, although the applicable statutory provisions 
mention neither as factors in the PSD program. 
The EAB has stated in numerous decisions that even without 
formal Agency rules or guidance on environmental justice, the EPA 
may address environmental justice issues in PSD permitting 
 
216 See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k); see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c) (ambient air increments). 
217 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Basic Information, EPA, http://www 
.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html (last updated July 22, 2011). 
218 Id. 
219 See Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, EPA General Counsel, to EPA Assistant 
Administrators on EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authorities Under Which 
Environmental. Justice Issues May Be Addressed in Permitting 12 (Dec. 1, 2000) 
[hereinafter EPA OGC Memorandum] (on file with the EPA), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/ej_permitting_authorities_memo_120 
100.pdf; see also Environmental Appeals Board, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB 
_Web_Docket.nsf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
220 See EPA OGC Memorandum, supra note 218. 
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decisions.221 In a 1999 decision, In re Knauf Fiber Glass, the EAB 
remanded a PSD permit to the delegated permitting authority citing 
the failure to provide an environmental justice analysis in the 
administrative record in response to comments raising the issue.222 
More recently, the EAB affirmed that a delegated permitting authority 
must consider environmental justice issues in reviewing whether to 
issue a PSD permit, based on Executive Order 12898223 directing 
executive branch agencies to consider environmental justice in 
Federal actions.224 However, it appears that the EAB will find an 
environmental justice analysis sufficient upon a showing that the 
proposed source will not cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation.225 
 
221 See EcoElectrica, L.P., PSD Appeal Nos. 96-8 and 96-13, 1997 EPA App. LEXIS 5, 
*27–32 (1997); P.R. Elec. Power Auth. (Cambalanche Combustion Turbine Project), PSD 
Appeal No. 95-2, 6 E.A.D. 253, 255–58 (1995); EPA, note 16, at 13–17; see also EPA 
OGC Memorandum, supra note 218, at 12. (Noting that the EAB first addressed 
environmental justice issues under the CAA in 1993 in the decision Power Station Limited 
Partnership, 4 E.A.D. 832 (1993). In that decision, the EAB stated that the CAA did not 
allow for consideration of environmental justice and siting issues in air permitting 
decisions. In response, the EPA’s Office of General Counsel (EPA OGC) filed a motion 
for clarification on behalf of the Office of Air and Radiation and Region V. EPA, supra 
note 16, at 13; EPA OGC Memorandum, supra note 217, at 12. Among other things, the 
EPA OGC asserted that the CAA requirement to consider alternatives to the proposed 
source, and the broad statutory definition of BACT, provided ample opportunity for 
considering environmental justice in PSD permitting; see 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) 
(requiring a public hearing where the EPA and interested persons have the opportunity to 
submit presentations on the air quality impact of the applicant source, alternatives to the 
applicant source, control technology requirements, and other appropriate considerations)); 
EPA, supra note 16, at 13–14; EPA OGC Memorandum, supra note 218, at 12. In an 
amended opinion and order (October 1993), the EAB deleted the controversial language 
without affirmative stating whether it is permissible to address environmental justice 
concerns under the PSD program. Gennesee Power Station Ltd. P’ship, 4 E.A.D. 832 
(1993). 
222 Knauf Fiber Glass, 8 E.A.D. 121, 124–27 (1999); see EPA, supra note 16, at 14; 
EPA OGC Memorandum, supra note 216, at 12. 
223 Exec. Order. No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
224 Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc. & Shell Offshore, Inc., (Frontier Discovery Drilling Unit), 
2010 EPA App. LEXIS 49, at *111–12 (2010) (citing Prairie State Generating Co., 13 
E.A.D. 1, 123 (EAB 2006), aff’d sub nom. Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 
2007); AES P.R., L.P., 8 E.A.D. 324, 351 (EAB 1999), aff’d sub nom. Sur Contra La 
Contaminacion v. EPA, 202 F.3d 443 (1st Cir. 2000); Knauf Fiber Glass GmbH, 8 E.A.D. 
121, 174–75 (EAB 1999); EcoElectrica, L.P., 7 E.A.D. 56, 67–69 (EAB 1997)). 
225 See Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc. & Shell Offshore, Inc., (Frontier Discovery Drilling 
Unit), 2010 EPA App. LEXIS 49, at *124 (noting that in the context of PSD permit 
challenges, EAB has accepted compliance with the NAAQS as sufficient to demonstrate 
that emissions from a proposed facility will not have disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects on a minority or low-income population) (citing 
Knauf II, 9 E.A.D. at 15–17; Sutter Power Plans, 8 E.A.D. 680, 692 (EAB 1999)); see also 
Avenal Power Ctr., LLC, 2011 EPA App. LEXIS 26, at *44 (finding that a “substantive  
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Nevertheless, the EAB has recognized that a permitting authority has 
discretion under PSD program regulations to establish permit 
conditions based on environmental justice considerations.226 
Under the CAA, a PSD permit decision must address whether 
emissions from the applicant source cause or contribute to violations 
of air emissions concentrations or increment limits.227 Thus, when 
issuing a PSD permit, the permit-issuing authority appears to have 
broad discretion to consider how a source interacts with other sources 
to produce the ambient air mix in an attainment area. In upholding the 
EPA discretion to address environmental justice even without formal 
Agency rules or guidance, the EAB decisions referenced above 
support this interpretation. 
As with environmental justice factors, the EPA has no formal rules 
or guidance addressing cumulative effects in the PSD review process. 
However, as with addressing environmental justice factors, a 
reasonable consideration in determining whether emissions cause or 
contribute to air quality violations is the cumulative effects of adding 
pollution from a new or modified source to a community already 
overburdened with other chemical and non-chemical stressors. 
Note that the EAB has addressed cumulative effects only in the 
context of visibility as an air quality-related value. In a 1992 decision, 
In re Old Dominion, a petitioner challenged a PSD permit asserting 
that by showing that all currently proposed sources collectively would 
adversely impact the affected land areas, the permitting authority 
could demonstrate that the emissions from the proposed source would 
have, “an adverse impact on the air quality-related values (including 
visibility)”228 on affected land.229 The EAB disagreed, stating, “PSD 
permit determinations are made individually under the [CAA] on a 
case-by-case basis, and the State is not required to withhold or deny a 
permit application for a qualified source based on the supposition that 
 
environmental justice analysis that endeavors to include and analyze data that is germane 
to the environmental justice issue raised during the comment period” may comply with the 
Executive Order even if it does not reach a definitive conclusion, if “the permit issuer 
demonstrates that it exercised its considered judgment when determining that it could not 
reach a determinative conclusion due to the insufficiency of available valid data”). 
226 EPA, supra note 16, at 16 (quoting AES P.R., L.P., 8 E.A.D. 324, 351 (EAB 1999)). 
227 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3). 
228 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d)(2)(C)(ii). 
229 Old Dominion Elec. Coop., 3 E.A.D. 779; 1992 EPA App. LEXIS 37, at *20 
(1992). 
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there might be an adverse impact on visibility in an area if other 
pending applications are subsequently approved.”230 However, 
although EAB did not require the permitting authority in that case to 
consider cumulative effects in evaluating visibility values, the Board 
suggested that there could be circumstances where it would be 
prudent “to consider the collective potential impacts on visibility from 
all prospective sources that have not yet received final permits.”231 
Therefore, the In re Old Dominion decision suggests that it is 
permissible for a PSD permitting authority to focus on cumulative air 
quality impacts, at least in evaluating the air quality value of 
visibility. 
Existing PSD program guidance appears to endorse at least a 
narrow consideration of cumulative effects in permitting decisions. 
For example, in PSD program guidance on modeling procedures for 
demonstrating compliance with the PM2.5 NAAQS, the EPA states 
“Secondary formation of PM2.5 from emissions of NOx, SOx and other 
compounds from sources across a large domain . . . may be the 
dominant source of ambient PM2.5 in some cases.”232 Agency 
guidance further states, “[I]f the facility emits significant quantities of 
PM2.5 precursors, some assessment of their potential contribution to 
cumulative impacts as secondary PM2.5 may be necessary.”233 On the 
other hand, the statutory “cause or contribute to” language could be 
viewed as limiting the considerations in a PSD permit process to air 
impacts, as opposed to considering the cumulative risks posed by air 
pollution, other media stressors, and non-chemical stressors. Still, 
there are environmental justice communities in many attainment areas 
where adding a new or modified source might raise serious public 
health issues because of the potential adverse cumulative effects of 
 
230 1992 EPA App. LEXIS at *20. 
231 Old Dominon Elec. Coop., 3 E.A.D. 779 at 20 n.24, (“While it may be prudent in 
such circumstances for a State to consider the collective potential impacts on visibility 
from all prospective sources that have not yet received final permits, nothing cited by 
Petitioners requires this type of planning.”). The EAB decision referred to existing EPA 
policy that, in determining whether a proposed source will cause an adverse impact on 
visibility, the cumulative visibility impacts of the pending PSD permit applicant and all 
PSD-permitted sources, including those not yet constructed, must be assessed against 
background visibility conditions. Id. 
232 Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning & 
Standards, on Modeling Procedures for Demonstrating Compliance with PM2.5 NAAQS 3 
(Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/region07/air/nsr/nsrmemos/pm25 
memo.pdf. 
233 Id. at 9. 
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multiple facilities. In such instances, based on EAB decisions, the 
PSD permitting authority has discretion to consider cumulative risk 
and impacts in decision making as part of an environmental justice 
analysis. 
To some extent, the EPA already does consider cumulative air 
pollutant impacts in PSD permitting decisions. Regarding the subject 
of cumulative effects of multiple air pollutants, in several places in its 
“Guideline on Air Quality Models,” the EPA addresses background 
concentrations of air pollutants and background air quality data as 
inputs to air quality models.234 Additionally, a currently available 
1990 Draft New Source Review Workshop Manual applicable to the 
same subject indicates that the Agency requires a full ambient air 
impact analysis to include the emissions from the proposed source 
itself, “the estimation of background pollutant concentrations 
resulting from existing sources,” and emissions from “residential, 
commercial, and industrial growth that accompanies the new activity 
at the new source or modification.”235 This manual states, however, 
that if a preliminary analysis shows the emissions from a proposed 
source as having only minimal impacts on ambient air quality, the 
permitting authority may allow an applicant to forego a full ambient 
air analysis.236 
In summary, the EAB decisions discussed above appear to support 
the EPA’s authority to establish permit conditions on the basis of 
cumulative effects or cumulative risk considerations, at least in terms 
of cumulative criteria pollutant impacts from all relevant exposure 
pathways in the relevant permit area. Because the CAA specifies that 
PSD permit decisions must ensure that emissions from the applicant 
source would “not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in excess of 
any [emissions limitation for each pollutant subject to PSD 
regulation], [NAAQS], or any other applicable emission . . . standard 
of performance,”237 it is not clear the considerations of cumulative 
risks could encompass non-criteria air pollutants or nonchemical 
stressors that might increase a population’s vulnerability to certain air 
 
234 40 C.F.R. § 51, (2013) (“Guideline on Air Quality Models”). 
235 See EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual: Draft C-24 to C-25 (1990), 
available at hhttp://www.epa.gov/region07/air/nsr/nsrmemos/1990wman.pdf. 
236 Id. 
237 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
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pollution effects.238 However, the stated purpose of the PSD program 
is “to protect public health and welfare from any actual or potential 
adverse effect . . . from air pollution or from exposures to pollutants 
in other media . . . notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of all 
[NAAQS].”239 The EPA could cite this statement of congressional 
purpose to interpret the PSD provisions as permitting a broad 
consideration of cumulative effects on overburdened communities 
(including consideration of non-air background health effects and 
non-chemical stressors) as a means of furthering the purpose of the 
PSD program and CAA.240 
IV 
ADDRESSING POTENTIAL COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE EPA’S 
CLAIM OF AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER CUMULATIVE EFFECTS 
UNDER CLEAN AIR ACT PROGRAMS 
If the EPA were to consider a cumulative risk assessment in 
implementing one of its broad CAA directives to protect the public 
health with an “ample margin of safety” (NAAQS and residual risk 
NESHAPs), consider “non-air quality health and environmental 
impacts” (NESHAPs), or issue permits that would, “not cause, or 
contribute to, air pollution in excess of any [emissions limitation or 
NAAQS]” (PSD program); such a decision might be opposed by 
stakeholders that believe the EPA has exceeded its CAA authority. 
These challengers would likely make at least two major arguments. 
First, a challenger would argue that based on the overall legislative 
structure for protecting human health and environmental resource 
areas, Congress implicitly prohibited considering cumulative effects 
outside of the specific pollutants or resource areas addressed by a 
particular statute. Second, a challenger would argue that the recent 
D.C. Circuit cases vacating the EPA’s rules attempting to implement 
the CAA “good neighbor” provision signal a strict construction of the 
 
238 Note that the EPA has recently asserted its position that, when establishing BACT 
for a source (i.e., PSD permit conditions) to control criteria pollutants, the Agency could 
consider a technology’s ability to control emissions of other pollutants. EPA, supra note 
16, at 17. This position suggests that a permitting authority could consider the cumulative 
effect of a proposed source’s emissions when combined with other HAPs sources in the 
relevant geographical area. 
239 Clean Air Act, § 160, 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1). 
240 See EPA, supra note 16, at 13 (stating that, “[t]he ability to condition a permit due 
to environmental justice considerations would further the purpose of [the PSD program] 
‘to protect public health and welfare’”). 
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CAA. The analysis below explains why these arguments would not be 
fatal to the EPA considering the results from a cumulative risk 
assessment in making decisions under these CAA programs. 
A. The Overall Legislative Structure Does Not Mandate Regulation 
by Individual Media 
A stakeholder challenging the EPA’s interpretation of the 
Agency’s statutory authority to consider the results of a cumulative 
risk assessment might argue that such a statutory interpretation is 
impermissible because the overall legislative structure for protecting 
human health and environmental resources prohibits considering 
stressors outside of the pollutants Congress addressed in a given 
statute.241 In other words, Congress has addressed environmental 
pollutants and problems on a piecemeal basis, or pollutant-by-
pollutant. Therefore, the argument would continue, when establishing 
standards for protecting the nation’s waters, for example, Congress 
did not intend a statute that addresses water pollutants to provide the 
EPA with authority to consider the combined health impacts of air 
pollutants and water pollutants. 
A challenger making this argument would likely cite Food and 
Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (FDA v. 
Brown).242 In that case, the Supreme Court refused to find that the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had authority to regulate 
tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 
reasoning that authority to regulate those products under the statute 
would require banning them from the market, based on FDA’s 
findings regarding the significant health risks posed by tobacco 
products.243 The Court concluded that such a ban would contradict 
Congress’s clear intent as expressed in recent tobacco-specific 
legislation to allow the continuing sale of tobacco products in the 
 
241 See Pamela Hill, Emerging Policy and Legal Directions at EPA, 33 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 625, 626–27 (1999) (noting that Congress has structured environmental statutes on 
media-specific bases, which has made it difficult to comprehensively protect 
environmentally significant places or to consider important factors such as sensitive 
populations and cumulative risk). 
242 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
243 Id. at 135–37, 160–61. 
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United States.244 The Court refused to defer to FDA’s expansive 
construction of its statute, explaining: 
“the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view 
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” A court must 
therefore interpret the statute “as a symmetrical and coherent 
regulatory scheme,” and “fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious 
whole.” Similarly, the meaning of one statute may be affected by 
other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently 
and more specifically to the topic at hand. In addition, [the 
reviewing court] must be guided to a degree by common sense as to 
the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision 
of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative 
agency.245 
Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in FDA v. Brown, one 
could argue that because Congress addressed different pollutants and 
the protection of different media under different statutory schemes, it 
did not intend for the EPA to consider the cumulative effects of all 
pollutants when determining how stringently to limit one type of 
pollutant. 
On the other hand, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court 
found that the EPA could find carbon dioxide to be an air pollutant 
under the CAA based on that pollutant’s contribution to global 
climate change, although the EPA argued the CAA did not 
contemplate the regulation of substances that contribute to climate 
change.246 In various CAA provisions, Congress has given the EPA 
undefined directives to do what is necessary to protect the public 
health with an ample margin of safety, presumably to allow the statute 
to remain flexible over time so that the Agency could decide whether 
to restrict pollutants based on the latest scientific advancements 
affecting the EPA’s understanding of health effects.247 Indeed, in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court explained that although: 
[T]he Congresses that drafted the [1970 Clean Air Act] might not 
have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead 
to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory 
flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments 
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language 
[directing EPA to prescribe standards for any air pollutants that 
‘cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
 
244 Id. at 137–39. 
245 Id. at 133 (citations omitted). 
246 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007). 
247 See id. at 532. 
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anticipated to endanger public health or welfare’] reflects an 
intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such 
obsolescence.”248 
Therefore, one reading of Massachusetts v. EPA is that Congress 
purposefully writes statutes broadly so that the EPA can implement 
them more effectively over time. This reading lends support to the 
argument that the EPA could interpret its various broad CAA 
authorities as permitting it to consider cumulative risks, if the Agency 
reasonably determined that the consideration of such evidence was 
necessary to carry out its statutory mandate effectively.249 
B. Recent “Good Neighbor” Provision Court Cases Do Not Signal a 
Strict Construction of the Clean Air Act 
A challenger also might cite EME Homer City Generation v. EPA 
(EME)250 and North Carolina v. EPA (North Carolina),251 to support 
an assertion that a CAA provision does not give the EPA discretion to 
consider the results of a cumulative risk assessment because in those 
cases, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Agency’s broad interpretation of 
its CAA authority. In EME and North Carolina, the D.C. Circuit 
rejected the EPA’s interpretations of the CAA provision that requires 
each SIP to ensure the prevention of “any . . . type of emissions 
activity” that “contribute[s] significantly to nonattainment in, or 
interfere[s] with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any 
[NAAQS]”252 (known as the “good neighbor” provision). In North 
Carolina, the D.C. Circuit found that the Agency went beyond its 
statutory authority when it established a regional interstate emissions 
trading program in an attempt to implement the “good neighbor” 
provision.253 In EME (2012), the D.C. Circuit vacated an EPA rule 
 
248 Id. at 532, 549 (citing Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) 
(“[T]he fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by 
Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
249 See id. at 529–32. 
250 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
251 North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
252 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). 
253 North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 907–22 (vacating the EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule 
because the “good neighbor” provision requires the elimination of emissions from sources 
contributing to nonattainment in downwind states and the emissions trading program 
established by the Clean Air Interstate Rule would not ensure this occurred because its  
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developed in response to the court’s North Carolina ruling that 
attempted to implement the “good neighbor” provision by defining 
emissions reduction responsibilities for upwind states based on those 
states’ contribution to downwind states’ air quality problems.254 In 
both cases, the court vacated the EPA’s rules, determining that the 
Agency had exceeded its “good neighbor” statutory authority. EME 
and North Carolina indicate that the D.C. Circuit reads the “good 
neighbor” provision as permitting the EPA to establish a program 
requiring each state to eliminate its own significant contribution to 
downwind pollution, or that achieves something measurable towards 
that goal, but that the EPA could not require anything more.255 
Some might argue that the D.C. Circuit’s analyses and narrow 
interpretations of the CAAin EME and North Carolina signal the D.C. 
Circuit’s hesitance to permit broad interpretations of the CAA.256 
Others might argue that the cases imply the court’s willingness to 
check what might be seen as excessive EPA action, and to require 
congressional action to change existing programs significantly.257 
However, the EPA statutory interpretation under review in EME and 
North Carolina was distinguishable from the statutory interpretations 
suggested in this Article. 
In EME and North Carolina, the court vacated the EPA rules at 
issue most notably for this discussion, because the “good neighbor” 
provision provides a very specific instruction rather than containing 
broad statutory mandates to protect the public health with an ample 
margin of safety.258 The specific instruction in the “good neighbor” 
provision that each SIP must ensure the prevention of “any . . . type of 
emissions activity” that “contributes significantly to nonattainment in, 
or interferes with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any 
 
trading programs would only guarantee that emissions would be reduced on a regional 
basis). 
254 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d 11–12 (vacating the EPA’s Cross-State Air 
Pollution rule because the “good neighbor” provision grants the Agency authority to 
require upwind States to reduce only their own significant contributions to a downwind 
state’s nonattainment, but the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule could require upwind states 
to reduce emissions by more than their own significant contributions to a downwind state’s 
nonattainment). 
255 See id. at 17–18, 44–45; North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 916–21. 
256 See Elizabeth Kruse, Case Comment: North Carolina v. EPA, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 283, 294–95 (2009). 
257 See id. at 294. 
258 See EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 14–15, 23–24; North Carolina, 531 
F.3d at 907–22. 
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[NAAQS]”259 contrasts with the broad statutory mandates to protect 
the public health we are addressing in this article, e.g., to establish 
standards “requisite to protect the public health” while “allowing an 
adequate margin of safety” (the NAAQS standard setting 
authority).260 Because a specific instruction is more limiting than a 
broad grant of authority, EME and North Carolina do not preclude the 
D.C. Circuit from upholding the EPA’s interpretation of its authority 
to consider any information or analyses the Agency reasonably 
determines is necessary to decide the level at which standards are 
protective of the public health. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In 2009, the NRC recommended that the EPA take account of 
cumulative risks in Agency risk assessments.261 However, the CAA 
does not direct the EPA as a regulator, or designated permitting 
authorities in the PSD program to evaluate cumulative risks of non-air 
pollutants or non-chemical stressors. Acknowledging the ambiguity 
regarding discretion to consider cumulative effects in CAA decision 
making, the authors conclude, based on the analysis in this article, 
that some of the CAA’s broad statutory directives to protect the 
public health allow room for the EPA to consider such cumulative 
effects. 
In Chevron, the Supreme Court created a two-part framework for 
reviewing agency interpretations of statutes it implements.262 At 
Chevron Step One, a reviewing court examines statutory language to 
determine whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue.263 The 
CAA directs the EPA to take actions necessary to protect the public 
health with an “ample margin of safety” (NAAQS and residual risk 
NESHAPs), to consider “non-air quality health and environmental 
impacts” (NESHAPs), and to issue permits that would “not cause, or 
contribute to, air pollution in excess of any [emissions limitation or 
NAAQS]” (PSD program).264 None of these or related CAA 
 
259 Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). 
260 Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
261 See NAT’L RES. COUNS., ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3. 
262 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
263 Id. at 842–43. 
264 Clean Air Act § 112(2), §§ 164(a)(2)(B); see id. § 165. 
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provisions speak directly to how these decisions are made or whether 
they provide discretion to consider cumulative risks in making 
decisions under these programs. A court reviewing a challenge to the 
EPA’s assertion of discretion to assess cumulative risks likely would 
find these CAA provisions ambiguous under Chevron Step One, and 
turn to a review of whether the EPA’s interpretation of its authority is 
reasonable under Chevron Step Two.265 Chevron suggests that if an 
agency makes a regulatory decision rationally based on some factor or 
analysis that the applicable Federal statute did not specifically 
prohibit the agency from considering, a court would not overturn the 
decision simply because of reliance on the unstated factor or analysis. 
Given the argument that a CAA provision allows the EPA 
discretion to use a cumulative risk assessment to support decision 
making under a CAA program, there remains the question of whether 
the EPA’s use of cumulative risk assessment in a particular 
circumstance can withstand arbitrary or capricious review under the 
APA. Whether a particular cumulative risk analysis is appropriate for 
consideration in an Agency policy or regulatory decision is a fact-
driven inquiry requiring case-by-case judicial examination. A 
reviewing court’s inquiry into the reasonableness of a cumulative risk 
assessment likely would examine whether the data and assumptions 
used in the assessment were rational, based on the available 
information, and whether the Agency’s conclusions were reasonable 
based on the analysis. If data and assumptions are sufficient for a 
court to decide “whether the agency’s conclusions are rationally 
supported,” the court must affirm.266 
In many current circumstances, making reasonable quantitative 
estimates of impacts using cumulative risk assessments would require 
 
265 Chevron, U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
266 Nw. Coal. for Alt. to Pesticides v. EPA, 544 F.3d 1043, 1057 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wright, J., 
dissenting)) (“Although the ultimate scope may be narrow, the depth must be sufficient for 
us to be able to comprehend the agency’s handling of the evidence cited or relied upon. 
The purpose of this in-depth review is to educate ourselves so that we can properly 
perform our reviewing function: determining whether the agency’s conclusions are 
‘rationally supported.’ For, although data interpretation and analysis are functions that 
often lie within an agency’s realm of expertise, it is our duty to review those functions to 
ascertain whether the agency’s actions were complete, reasoned, and adequately explained. 
The mere fact that an agency is operating in a field of its expertise does not excuse us from 
our customary review responsibilities. And, where the agency’s reasoning, although 
complex, is rational, clear, and complete, we must affirm. Contrarily, where the agency’s 
reasoning is irrational, unclear, or not supported by the data it purports to interpret, we 
must disapprove the agency’s action.”) (citations omitted). 
ALVES (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2014  1:37 PM 
2013] EPA Authority to Consider Cumulative Effects and 209 
Cumulative Risk Assessments in Decision Making 
under the Clean Air Act 
access to data that currently are nonexistent or insufficient. Recently, 
potential users in the scientific community have suggested the 
necessity and value of having the following cumulative effects data 
and tools: larger emissions inventories, air quality monitoring 
networks, modeling software, and pollution inventories expanded to 
unregulated operations.267 The authors believe that the EPA and the 
scientific community should focus on developing the necessary data 
and tools to provide a sound, cumulative risk assessment framework. 
The Agency then should develop guidelines for a cumulative risk 
assessment methodology, including guidance for evaluating 
qualitative cumulative effects. 
  
 
267 See NAT’L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNS., ENSURING RISK REDUCTION IN 
COMMUNITIES WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL. JUSTICE AND 
CUMULATIVE RISKS/IMPACTS 47–48 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/environ 
mentaljustice/resources/publications/nejac/nejac-cum-risk-rpt-122104.pdf; ENVTL. 
JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNS. TO THE N.J. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, CUMULATIVE 
IMPACTS SUBCOMMITTEE, STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING CUMULATIVE IMPACTS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES 26 (2009), available at http://www.state.nj.us/ 
dep/ej/docs/ejac_impacts_report200903.pdf; MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, 
PROCESS FOR CUMULATIVE LEVELS AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR MINN. STAT. § 116.07, 
SUBD. 4A, available at http://www.cumulativeimpacts.org/documents/ProcessDocument 
_5_10.pdf; N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION & N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF 
HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HEALTH OUTCOME DATA WORK GROUP (2006), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov /docs/permits_ej_operations_pdf/hodreport.pdf; N.Y. STATE DEPT. 
OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION DISPROPORTIONATE ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ANALYSIS WORK GROUP, FINAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION DISPROPORTIONATE ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 
WORK GROUP (2004), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/permits_ej_operations_ 
pdf/daeireport.pdf. 
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